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In late Qing and early Republican China (1895-1930), the Chinese concept of 
sacrifice (犧牲) underwent a major transformation from a ritual victim to a 
moral and political act.  
 
This semantic shift highlighted a more fundamental cosmological 
transformation as linear time overtook cyclical time as the dominant temporality. 
Based mainly on published writings of thinkers, statesmen and writers, the 
thesis examines this cosmological transformation in three interrelated domains 
in late Qing and early Republican China.  
 
In the domain of political rituals, history replaced cosmos or nature as the 
overarching context for ritual sacrifice. In the domain of intellectual history, 
newly formulated modern spiritual concept of jingshen (精神) fundamentally 
interiorized modern China’s spiritual landscape. In the domain of self-
formation, nationalist self-sacrifice superseded age-old Confucian self-
cultivation as the dominant ideal for elite selfhood.  
 
The transformation of sacrifice prepared the grounds for momentous historical 
development in twentieth century China as the new concept of sacrifice engaged 
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During China’s modernization during the last two hundred years, many Chinese 
words have changed their significance. But perhaps few are more closely 
bounded with the changing meaning of society and everyday life than Xisheng 
(犧牲), the modern Chinese word for moral sacrifice. In the classical language, 
Xisheng means animals of pure colour used for ritual sacrifice, especially hogs, 
bulls and sheep. But in modern usage, the commonly used word refers to an act 
of giving up something valuable and especially one’s life for a common cause.1 
As the word sacrifice took on its modern connotation, its classical meaning 
completely disappeared and was substituted by the object for sacrifice (祭品, 
Jiping).  
The drastic change in the meaning of sacrifice brings the word down from the 
exotic material world of ritual preparations to the very heart of modern Chinese 
experience. With the abolishment of most official ritual sacrifice that requires 
blood and flesh of actual animals, twentieth century China had more abundantly 
more taste of sacred violence. In course of the twentieth century, China saw 
hundreds of thousands of her sons and daughters sacrifice their life or Xisheng 
for the nationalist cause. Had not the National Anthem of the People’s Republic 
urged all Chinese people to build the new Great Wall with their “blood and 
flesh”? Behind the sematic transformation of sacrifice there is another 
conceptual transformation of sacrifice, as the ancient word for sacrificial animal 
                                                          
1 Luo Zhufeng ed, Hanyu Dacidian (Grand Dictionary of the Chinese Language), 
Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1986, Vol.6, p.290.  
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is used to conceptualize something fundamentally different from the ritual 
theme yet uncannily reminiscent of the sacred violence of “blood and flesh”.  
The purpose of the thesis is not to date the emergence of the modern meaning 
for sacrifice, which could be traced to early twentieth century.2 While such an 
empirical study is certainly worthwhile, this study is not about the history of the 
word. It is centrally concerned with the conceptual transformation of sacrifice. 
This conceptual transformation was not simply a linguistic event. Rather, it was 
a larger manifold process that took place in many domains in interaction with 
many important historical forces. Moreover, it is not a smooth process in the 
sense that modern concepts and practices simply replaced tradition in a short 
period of time.  
To understand this larger and more complex process we need much closer 
examinations of academic literature on the modern transformation of sacrifice. 
But before embarking on a discussion of modern sacrifice from Chinese and 
global perspectives let me begin with a famous historical episode to bring out 
the issue at stake: a soul-stealing rumour during ritual inauguration of the Sun 
Yat-sen Mausoleum. It best demonstrates how modern Chinese state and its elite 
led the transition to modern sacrifice even as the society held fast to the 
traditional ideas and practices. 
                                                          
2 According to search results from the Chinese Language Corpus at Center of Chinese 
Linguistic of Peking University, the earliest examples were dated to 1910s. But Liang 
Qichao already used the term sacrifice as early as 1904. Thus we may presume the word 
was first used in 1900s and came to popular use in the 1910s. C.f. Chinese Language 




In late April 1928, days ahead of the completion of the main buildings of Sun 
Yat-sen Mausoleum, a rumour swept across the neighbourhood of Nanjing, the 
new designated capital of Nationalist China. It was circulated that the dome of 
the sacrificial hall, the core building in the Mausoleum complex, would require 
the spirit of forty-nine young children for its final completion and witches 
dressed as good folk would help to collect the spirit in magic bottles by calling 
the names of the children. Parents were further panicked by stories of 
unattended children who had fallen victim to witchcraft and died shortly after 
they fell into unconsciousness. In a matter of days, the rumour wreaked havoc 
inside the city walls, in suburb areas and neighbouring towns. Shops were closed, 
schools were emptied, and families with little children even attempted to move 
out to safer areas to hide from the spell.  
The Nationalist government, which was not more than one year old at the time, 
joined hands with the press in the investigation. It soon became clear that the 
panic were instigated by disgruntled teachers of traditional classic schools who 
were trying to thwart the government’s public school reform. In early April, the 
Nationalist government organized a pre-enrolment census to register school-age 
children with the education bureau in preparation for school opening in autumn. 
Fearing that the public schools will take away their daily breads, the private 
tutors attempted to sabotage the government programs by scaring away their 
potential students. It took the nascent modern bureaucracies of the Nanjing 
government a full month of public campaigns to keep the situation under 
control.3   
                                                          
3 The sketch of events is based on two previous works: Liu Xiyuan, “1928 nian 
Nanjing de Shehun fengbo”(The Soul-stealing rumour of 1928 in Nanjing), Guangxi 
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But there is a further nuance to the story. Although the incident was provoked 
by schools registration, the potent image of the Mausoleum also played a role. 
For the common folk, the Mausoleum Complex was a locus of powerful and 
potentially harmful spiritual forces. In traditional cosmogony and geomancy, it 
is always advisable for the common people to hide away from these powerful 
loci. Although the Manchu Empire had collapsed for more than decade, the 
older cosmological terrain remained intact.  
The soul-stealing incident begs further questions. In what ways did the political 
ritual associated with and exemplified by the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum depart 
from ancient ideas and practices? How was the idea of spirit understood 
differently between by the social elites who participated in construction and the 
common people who seemed mostly apathetic and at times so fearful? And how 
did the nationalistic elite who create the new rituals and sacrifice to the new 
spirit think and act in accordance with the moral principles of sacrifice? These 
interrelated questions, which constitute the major themes of the three chapters 
of this thesis, naturally lead us to the cosmic-moral aspect of the modern 
sacrifice which shall constitute the core of the thesis.  
Harrison’s classic study of Republican political rituals and machinations is an 
excellent starting point for a preliminary examination. Focusing on tensions 
between the common people in early Republican China and its realized version, 
she argues that the burial ceremony of Sun Yat-sen held at the Mausoleum 
marked the ritual legitimization of the Nationalist Party as the guide of the 
                                                          
shehui kexue, no. 108 (June 2004): pp. 163-166; Liu Baoji, “Yanyan zhijing: 1928 
nian Nanjing Shihun konghuang de duochong Jiedu” (Mirror of rumors: multiple 
interpretation of the soul-stealing panic of 1828 in Nanjing), Journal of Fudan 
University, no. 2, 2012, pp.121-135.  
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nation, although this message was not necessarily received by the participating 
common people as such. 4 
Apparently, different cosmos-moral systems were at work for the elites and the 
common people in China in the late twenties. The elites tended to see a moral 
significance in Sun Yat-sen’s spirit in the Mausoleum, not only as homage to a 
great man but also a vision of the modern Chinese nation. But for the common 
people, the Mausoleum was sacred not so much due to its moral significance as 
its supernatural powers. The cosmos myths about the power of the son-of-
heaven, which constantly emanates spiritual forces, were still much alive.  
For the elites who shared a common moral vision, sacrifice was always for a 
certain common moral cause, but for those who still embraced an older cosmic-
moral universe, sacrifice continued to function as rituals for seeking protection 
and avoiding harm from the heavenly deities and earthly spirit. The distinctions 
were by no means categorical, as the two modes often existed in hybrid forms 
in everyday practices, although the process of modern nation-building did pit 
one form of spirituality against another.5   
The general distinctions between these two modes of sacrifice were articulated 
by religious scholars in the Christian-Judaism tradition. In On Sacrifice, Israeli 
scholar Moshe Halbertal distinguishes sacrifice to from sacrifice for. The 
former is gift offering to the God in exchange for cleaning of sin, whereas the 
                                                          
4 Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies 
and Symbols in China, 1911-1929, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.217-218. 
5 For the Nationalist campaign against religion, refer to: Prasentija Duara, Rescuing 
History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp.87-115.    
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latter is the morally defined “giving up vital interests for a higher cause”. 6 In 
this sense, the former always aims for something substantive and material, 
whereas later necessarily requires interiorization, since the higher causes can 
only function as abstract concepts.  
Another Jewish scholar, Guy G. Stroumsa, contextualizes the two modes of 
sacrifice in historical terms. In The End of Sacrifice, Stroumsa argues that the 
rise of Christianity as the religion of the book and a community religion in Late 
Antiquity marked the end of a sacrifice-based civic religion of the late Roman 
Empire. Old sacrifices to the Greco-Roman deities were condemned as 
superstitions and replaced by the Christian Mass. The transformation entailed a 
whole new practice of the self, which was the interiorization of the older mode 
of self in the Antiquity.7  
The work by German scholar Burkhardt Wolf on the transformation and 
prevalence of sacrifice in modern Western political, social and economic 
discourses also provides important insights into the role of sacrifice in the 
making modern societies. Most importantly, modern sacrifice was “no longer 
just an instrument of the king, but the medium of sovereignty, setting its 
boundary and condition for capacities” since the mid-seventeenth century.8 In 
other words, sacrifice was to provide a foundation for modern political discourse 
in the West as the modern body politic demanded human, financial and moral 
contribution from its heterogeneous constituents. Here Burkhardt restates in 
                                                          
6 Moshe Halbertal, On Sacrifice, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2012, p.1. 
7 Guy G. Stroumsa, The End of Sacrifice, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009, pp.26-27. 
8  Burkhardt Wolf, Die Sorge des Souveräns: Eine Diskursgeschichte des Opfers, 
Zurich & Berlin: Diaphanes, 2004, p.412 
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more abstract manner the points made by Halbertal on the political bond as 
sacrificial bond.  
While Burkhardt seeks to explore the conceptual transformation in European 
thoughts, Ivan Strenski’s discussion of the contesting notions of political 
sacrifice focuses on the nineteenth and early twentieth century France. In his 
study of political use of sacrifice, Strenski identifies the migration of religious 
ideas like sacrifice to politics and religious understanding of nationalism.9 The 
same principle applies to modern social thought, as Strenski identifies in 
Durkheimian notion of sacrifice recognition of the sacrificial nature of social 
life and a partial transplantation of Catholics ideals into modern social theory.10 
These theses on the transformation of sacrifice in Western scholarship offer a 
frame of reference for twentieth-century China. For example, there are parallels 
between the Church or religious groups and modern Chinese political parties, 
from late Qing secret societies to the Nationalist and Communist parties in terms 
of their ideology, organization and discipline.11 And above all, the most striking 
similarity between these two transformations two thousand years apart suggests 
a strong influence of Western and Christian ideas and practices.  
In the studies of modern sacrifice in Chinese context, two recent works stand 
out in recent scholarship: Rebecca Nedostup’s The Superstitious Regimes and 
                                                          
9 Ivan Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in 
France, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp.8-11 
10 Ibid, pp.177-179 
11 Wolfgang Kubin, Jidujiao, rujiao yu zhongguoxiandai geming Jingshen 
(Christianity, Confucianism and Revolutionary Spirit in Modern China), Hong Kong: 
Institute of Sino-Christian Studies, pp. 1-24. 
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Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer’s The Religious Question, which I will 
discuss further in the main body of the thesis. 
Although the thrust of Nedostup’s book focuses on survival of older religious 
practices, she also looks at new affective state effort to build “affective regimes” 
like the cult of Sun Yat-sen to replace religion.12 As it turns out, state-sponsored 
affective regimes managed to coexist with a set of competing affective regimes. 
Nedostup also interprets the soul-stealing incident in Nanjing as, “multiple and 
contradictory feelings towards the Nationalists” in the popular mind in a 
moment of political uncertainty. 13 
Unlike Nedostup, Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer focus on the 
transformation of popular religion from ascriptive communal cults employing 
religious specialists to voluntary, congregation and body-cultivation styled 
groups. They find traditional ritual sacrifice in late imperial China evolving into 
myriad forms in modern times. But this modern religiosity is also marked by a 
shift from cosmic technology to congregational moral practices. 14 
While both works sketch out changes in modern Chinese religious practices and 
state policies, they still foreground conceptual domains of religion and politics. 
But was there such a sharp distinction between politics and religion when it 
came to modern Chinese sacrifice?  
                                                          
12 Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese 
Modernity, MA: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp.254-255. 
13 Ibid, pp.274 
14 Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, pp. 304-305. 
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Take revolutionary martyrdom for the Nationalist or the Communist cause. Is 
this kind of sacrifice religious or non-religious? From the vantage point of self-
transcendence, an act of moral self-sacrifice is not only functionally similar but 
also structurally comparable to what Stroumsa would call an “interiorized” 
sacrifice. Also, commitment to abstract concepts like God and the national and 
teachings of the Book or doctrines of Sanminzhuyi (三民主义) are also similarly 
structured. Clearly, these ideas and practices of sacrifice were at same time 
religious and political.  
Without recourse to familiar categories like politics and religion, I shall consider 
the evolution of different ideas and practices of sacrifice in a cosmic-moral 
setting in modern China in three interrelated domains: cosmological context of 
political rituals, the idea of spirit (ling靈, qi氣 and jingshen精神) and self-
formation in early twentieth century China.   
As a study in the history of ideas, this thesis will examine representative writings 
of key thinkers and statesmen against longer historical transformation and 
political and social contexts of the period. I would draw as primary materials 
from three types of writings on political rituals, the concept of spirit and self-
formation.  
The first category of writings are works of emperors and revolutionary leaders 
that reflect on the nature of political rituals and sacrifice, such as Qianlong 
Emperor and Guangxu Emperor, and most importantly, Sun Yat-sen’s Jianguo 
fanglue (Plan for a Nation).  I focus on these writings because they clearly 
demonstrate the changing context of sacrifice for rulers from the eighteenth to 
the twentieth century. A more comprehensive survey on rulership sacrifice 
15 
 
would admittedly include a wider pool of sources, but such a selection would 
be sufficient to identify and delineate the transformation.  
The second class of writings are important philosophical and cultural texts that 
shaped or reflected the changing understanding of spirit in modern China. This 
would include conception of proto-spirit in Wang Fuzi, the reinvention of 
modern spirit in Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen and the wider application of the 
new concept in early Republican cosmological and religious writings. In 
particular, I will analyse closely Liang Qichao’s essay on the idea of spirit, the 
definitive text that established the modern spirit or jingshen. Again, I will have 
to limit my study to key texts that defines the conceptual transformation of 
sacrifice while relying on secondary literature on history of Chinese philosophy 
and religion to provide a longue durée synopsis of the conceptual transformation.  
The third category of writings includes modern Chinese autographical writings 
which present a changing idea of selfhood. The autobiographical writings I 
utilize include diaries, and personal testimony saw an explosively growth. Given 
the limited scope of the study compared to the huge amount of sources, my 
purpose is not to survey the massive autobiographical literature. Rather, I shall 
closely examine some notable examples, such as Gui Youguang’s essay, Wu 
Mi’s early diaries, Fang Zhiming’s prison essays and self-improvement 
guidebooks and a popular Bildungsroman in the 1930s. Aided by works on the 
social and economic changes in the period, I shall make an attempt to sketch out 
the changing elite ideas and practices of self-formation as the constitutive 
principle shifts from self-cultivation to self-sacrifice in early twentieth century.   
16 
 
The thesis will be divided into three chapters and a short conclusion. The first 
chapter shall trace the fundamental shifts in the cosmology underlying the 
political rituals in late imperial and Republican China. I argue that history 
gradually replaced cosmic deity of Grand Sacrifice such as Tian (Nature) as 
underlying context for the new political rituals of sacrifice in Qing China. 
Meanwhile, the Grand Sacrifice to Nature declined and eventually disappeared 
as the Mandate of Heaven ceased to be the sacred for Chinese politics.15  
The second chapter focuses on the idea of spirit in modern Chinese philosophy, 
religion, politics, cosmology and popular culture, especially in the writings of 
key figures like Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen. I shall demonstrate that the 
modern spirit of Jingshen was invented in the early twentieth century based on 
principles of social evolution and Buddhist concept of karma, before it became 
a popular concept of the sacred closely associated with moral sacrifice and 
nationalist politics. While it never really superseded the older notion of Qi and 
Ling, it did subsequently lead to an interiorization of the spiritual world of early 
Republican China.  
The third chapter examines elite self-formation in early twentieth century China, 
when the age-old idea and practice of self-cultivation was subject to the logics 
of sacrifice. Since the late nineteenth century, the production of Chinese elite 
was increasingly yoked to nation building and delinked from Confucian rituals. 
As older practice of self-cultivation declined and transformed, the modern 
                                                          
15 Sacrifice to Nature was already in decline in the late Qing. In the Chinese domain, 
the last Grand Sacrifice to Nature was Yuan Shikai’s sacrifice at the Altar to Heaven at 
Winter Solstice of 1913. During the Republican period, sacrifice to natural deities at 
China’s ethnic peripherals were sporadically performed but not at the Han heartland. 
The last such ritual was sacrifice to the god of Qinghai Lake in 1949.  
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Chinese elite, especially students in modern schools, gradually subscribed to a 
sacrificial and nationalistic ethos.  
In the conclusion, I shall return to the common theme of the three chapters and 
discuss the significance of the transformation with regard to later developments 
in the Chinese Revolution and modern world history as well as the larger global 
transformation.   
Lastly, I need to justify the time period of my study from 1895 to 1930. The two 
years each mark an important political watershed: China’s wakening to its 
inferior status in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the 
consolidation of the Nationalist party-state as the dominant force in Chinese 
politics in 1930, after its victory in the Central Plain War. While these are 
political events, they could also symbolize the decline of the old and the rise of 
new cosmologies underlying pre-modern and modern Chinese political regimes.   
But the dating of this period of transformation is symbolic and approximate. 
Like any work in history of ideas, this study also needs to trace an invisible 
process with deeper historical roots and a longer time of fermentation than a 
political event or an economic crisis. For this reason, some chapters would have 
to extend before 1895 or extend after the year 1930, although the main body of 
the thesis will focus on the three decades between 1895 and 1930 where the 





Cosmos and History: 
Changing Context of Rulership Sacrifice in Qing and Republican China, 
1700-1924 
 
Although the domain of sacrifice could extend infinitely to embrace all of 
human activities, the choice of ritual sacrifice in politics as the starting point 
were not arbitrary. In a sense, the political scene was the most striking 
illustration of the transformation as sea change in the Chinese ideas and 
practices of sacrifice. Barely a decade separated the last sacrifice to Heaven and 
the first sacrificial rituals of modern party state. In other domains, the change 
would be much slower, as I shall discuss in later chapters.  By focusing on the 
domain of political rituals, I could identity the sacrifice in a most explicit way. 
But even in this case we can observe a gradual shift for at least a millennium 
and clear signs of transformation from about 1700.    The modern transformation 
of sacrifice in Chinese political rituals can be clearly traced to Qing times, when 
human worthies such as Confucius rose in importance and eventually took an 
equal status with the natural deities while martyrs to the Qing cause became 
formally enshrined in state sacrificial rituals. Meanwhile, a textual monument 
to the emperors was created in military history, dynastic genealogy and personal 
writings as testimony to the Qing ruler’s words and deeds.  
After the fall of the Qing and especially since the establishment of the 
Nationalist state, the whole sacrificial system was reformulated along the line 
of development already visible in Qing times. Cosmic rituals of sacrifices were 
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simplified to such extent that it barely existed as a system. In contrast, moral 
sacrifice for a historical vision assumed ritual supremacy, in new rituals like 
oath-taking, Party Congresses and rituals to commemorate the martyrs became 
prominent. By the 1930s, at the level of Nationalist party-state, the cosmic 
rituals of sacrifice were generally replaced by political rituals that were 
associated with history-making.  
In understanding the transformation, it seems safe to begin with the key figure 
of Sun Yat-sen. In the first major American study on Sun, Harold Z. Schiffrin 
portrays him as of an upstart opportunist, handicapped by birth but employed 
correct symbols and strategies at the right time in the lead up to his leadership 
at Revolutionary Alliance.16 But this image is countered by C. Martin Wilbur’s 
Sun Yat-sen as a well-intentioned but overzealous adventurer.17 It was not until 
Marie-Claire Bergère’s definitive political biography of Sun Yat-sen that we 
found an aporia between Sun the hero and the historical figure. In her revisionist 
work, she echoes an earlier image of the historical Sun as political opportunist 
and ideologically bricoleaur. But she also laments that demolition of Sun leaves 
a void in the history of Chinese revolution, unless “a redefinition of Sun’s role 
in revolutionary movement and revolutionary thought” can be found. 18 
The study of Sun Yat-sen as the central figure of the Chinese Revolution might 
benefit from a broadened horizon. In fact, the Chinese Revolution that Sun 
heralded not only concerned the regime but also redefined everything in “all 
                                                          
16 Harold Z. Schiffrin. Sun Yat-sen and the origins of the Chinese revolution. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.,pp.7-9. 
17 C. Martin Wilbur. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 1976., pp. 288-289 
18 Marie-Claire Bergère. Sun Yat-sen (translated by Janet Lloyd). Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 2001. p.417   
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under the heaven”, including language, culture and religion. In other words, it 
is also cosmological.  
If revolution is cosmological, then a direct inquiry on the meaning of sacrifice 
offers a promising vantage point. For one thing, we can take a longer view than 
it is usually sanctioned. The change in the meanings of sacrifice, unlike a 
political revolution, usually takes place in a longer time framework. Second, we 
can examine some historical themes from a different angle, such as the impact 
of Christianity in China, through the lens of sacrifice. Third, we can also 
examine the modern Chinese state as constructed by rituals, texts and conscious 
acts of sacrifice.  
This chapter shall examine the transformation in the meaning and context of 
sacrifice in rulership sacrifice from Qing to Republican China. By rulership 
sacrifice I refer to ritual sacrifices that require the performance of the ruler in 
the capacity of the chief priest or a chairperson and at the same time legitimize 
his or her leadership position. I argue that rulership sacrifice in China, which 
was primarily framed as ritual communication with Nature and deities of 
historical origins in imperial China, became increasingly oriented towards a 
future vision and act of history-making in late imperial and modern China. This 
process of transformation took a dramatic acceleration during the late Qing 
crisis, until it was given a definitive modern shape by Sun Yat-sen in the 1910s 
and 1920s. 
 




Since recorded history, the ruling dynasty in China was conceived as part of the 
cyclical process of the cosmos. The legitimacy of the emperor was also based 
on the cosmic sacred symbolized by the time-honored imperial model of state 
sacrifices. The underlying logics of these sacrifices more or less followed Sima 
Qian’s definition of rites in Shiji:  
“Heaven and Earth are the origins of all living beings; Ancestors, the origins of 
humanity; the Kings and the Teachers, the origins of government. If there were 
no Heaven and Earth, whence life? If there were no ancestors, whence humanity? 
If there were no Kings and Teachers, whence government? If any of the three 
were absent, there will not be peaceful life for the People. Thus the Rites serve 
the Heaven upward and the Earth downward, honor the Ancestors and promote 
the Kings and the Teachers. These are the three origins of the Rites.”19  
From pre-Qin to Tang times, this ritual reciprocity indicated by Sima Qian 
worked on a model of cosmological kingship. Under this model of kingship, the 
legitimacy of ruler was based on his direct communication with the heavenly 
realm or with Nature. There were several channels for such communication: 
sacrifice to Heaven at the Tai Mountain, possession of the legendary Jade Seal, 
appearance of auspicious signs in heaven and earth and the theory of cycles of 
five virtues.  
But from the Song Dynasty onwards, all the emblems of cosmological kingship 
declined. Books on revelations were removed from the list of legitimate 
divination and fell to the rank of superstitions in the official episteme; the cycle 
of five virtues was under heavy fire from Confucius literati and eventually 
                                                          
19 Sima Qian, Shiji, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. 1976., p. 1167. 
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phased out in early Ming; the last sacrifice at the Tai Mountain was conducted 
in 1007 AD and thence discontinued; the myth of the Jade Seal gradually 
became unimportant in Song and eventually lost all its magical sway in the Ming 
and Qing periods.20  
As the Emperor ceased to communicate with Nature directly, symbolic sacrifice 
to Nature remained the only significant channel for accessing the sacred. The 
Qing state rituals were constructed purely as the ruler’s symbolic manipulation 
of cosmic forces in elaborate ritual compound. This extenuated but robust link 
provided sufficient ground for the highest state or rulership sacrifice (吉禮 jili) 
in late imperial China. 
In late imperial China, these sacrifices were categorized into three categories in 
descending order: the Grand Sacrifice, the Middle Sacrifice and Group Sacrifice. 
Grand Sacrifice includes sacrifices to Heath, Earth, Grain and ancestral temples. 
After thousand years of gradual transformation, the Qing Grand Sacrifice was a 
highly symbolic, rigidly scripted and standardized act of the imperial body, 
including elaborate construction of ritual texts, symbolic space for sacrifice and 
detailed ritual procedures.21 This high ritualism contrasted with earlier imperial 
rituals, when direct communications between emperor and the cosmic spirit 
often took place without any intermediary.  
                                                          
20 Liu Pujiang. The end of the Five Virtues theory: Changes of traditional political 
culture in China since the Song Dynasty” .Frontiers of History in China, vol.2,no.4. 
pp.532-540. 
21 Angela Zito. Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in 
Eighteenth-Century China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997., passim.  
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While inheriting most deities from the Ming, the Qing also made crucial 
modifications to their state sacrifice.22 The first major modification was the 
elevation of many historical figures and human inventions to deities in the 
Group Sacrifice category as the number of such deities surged from 8 to 53. The 
additions were mostly deities associated with a historic origin, such as the God 
of Gun, God of Medicine and human worthies as embodiments of cosmic spirit. 
23 A number of human worthies were elevated more than once during Qing 
times. For example, in Qing state sacrificial system, Guanyu was first included 
in the group sacrifice and then elevated to middle sacrifice under Xianfeng in 
1853. 24 
The second major modification was the establishment of shrines dedicated to 
martyrs and meritorious officials who made sacrifices and contributions to the 
Qing imperial enterprise, under the category of Group Sacrifice under the reign 
of Yongzheng in the year 1724.25 This act was significant, since it was the first 
time that human worthies as martyrs for a specific imperial enterprise entered 
into state ritual, as they formerly only enjoyed ritual sacrifice at local shrines. 
By introducing historical figures in a big way, state sacrifice in Qing was 
increasingly oriented towards commemoration of history. 
While Qing state ritual sacrifice prominently featured history as a source of the 
sacred, more salient case for defining sacrifice historically could be found in 
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Qing official historiography. In addition to ritual sacrifice, the Qing emperors 
found it of utmost importance to transmit moral values through a body of sacred 
historical texts, from veritable records (shilu), genealogical study (yuanliu kao), 
campaign plan (fanglue), moral instructions (shengxun) and collected works of 
emperors (yuzhi shiwenji). As part of Qing statecraft, official histories are no 
less important than the sacrificial rituals in its symbolism of rulership.   
Fanglue, or history of military plans, represents one of these efforts made on 
behalf of Qing emperors. Compiled meticulously after each major military and 
political campaign, the sheer volume of Qing fanglue makes it the most 
voluminous genre after veritable records. There is an apparent oxymoron about 
history as plan: how to write history as planned or, how to plan a history? But 
this is exactly the point of the fanglue texts, which is intended to show military 
campaigns as an execution of the imperial plan or vision. When Qing official 
historians compiled the first fanglue that commemorated Kangxi’s successful 
campaigns against the three feudatories in 1683, the editors were fully aware of 
this ceremonial feature. As the Minister of Rite argued: 
“These emperors of previous dynasties either relied on the power of their 
ministers without making decisions themselves, or only recorded their victories 
over weak enemies so as to glorify themselves… These were nothing compared 
with our emperor, who, with ingenuous plans all by himself, wiped out the chief 
villains…..Within eight years, there were not the slightest miscalculations. The 
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imperial realm was pacified and his benevolence and valor far surpassed earlier 
dynastic rulers….”26  
In other words, Qing fanglue was intended as a textual monument to the Qing 
ruler, who, unlike earlier emperors, felt a need to construct such a text. Besides 
the stated purpose to deter future rebels, it also showed that the emperor was 
indeed personally in control of the flow of events from the very start to full 
accomplishment, which by any standards must be a selective reconstruction.  
In his study of the fanglue texts on Qing Zunghar campaigns, Peter Perdue 
points to inconsistency in the texts: “Despite desirable editorial manipulation, 
the fanglue documents do not tell a completely unified story….Despite the best 
efforts of the editors to present a supremely confident, consistent imperial will, 
the fanglue, by virtues of its very abundance, contains contradictory 
information.”27 But the inconsistency is in fact consistent with the nature of 
fanglue as a textual monument of an emperor constructed for his imperial 
successors. For example, the Huangqing kaiguo fanglue (The Plan for Founding 
the Imperial Qing) commissioned by Qianlong retold the heroic story of Qing 
founders through Nurhaci to Fulin. In the lengthy preface to the work, Qianlong 
expressed his admiration about the early Qing rulers: 
“…..As the Heaven give birth to the Sage to govern the Four Seas there must be 
auspicious signs different from commoners. But more importantly, the Sage 
governs by virtue of his exertion of intelligence and courage and endurance of 
                                                          
26 Qingding pingding sanni fanglue, Siku Quanshu, juan 354. Taipei: Commercial Press. 
1990. Pp.355.  
27 Peter Perdue. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Mass.: 
Cambridge. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2005, p. 469.  
26 
 
sufferings and hardship, by which he can excel the human realm and answer to 
the Mandate of Heaven! How can this be easy! As a descendent (of the Sage), I 
guard my ancestor’s enterprise; whenever I read the veritable Records and 
pictured Taizu (Nurhaci) at the founding days of our nation, as he himself 
carried shield and fought his ways among the blades. I could not bear to read 
and speak as tears fell.…”28  
Qianlong did not altogether deny the validity of heavenly signs, but he valued 
above all valor and sagacity as the chief quality of the ruler. Nurhaci was a 
qualified a ruler primarily for his daring sacrifice for the Qing cause. Even as 
Qianlong continued to participate in regular Grand Sacrifice, he must have spent 
considerable time reading and editing these texts. In this process, the emperor 
was consciously connecting with his imperial ancestors and a larger imagined 
body politic created by his their imperial ancestors. This essentially Manchu 
body politic was the prime subject of Qing official history, in particular, 
histories such as Kaiguo fanglue, Study of Manchu Ancestry (Manzhou 
Yuanliukao) and General Gazetteer of Eight Banners (Baqi Tongzhi), which 
served to mark the boundary of Manchu identity.29  
But while moral sacrifice was already understood and celebrated in texts and 
rituals in Qing, the boundary between cosmic ritual and everyday acts of 
sacrifice was still carefully monitored, as the Qing Empire maintained the 
system of its state sacrificial rituals broadly unchanged throughout the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth century. The deliberate subjection of other 
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sacrifice to the cosmic Grand Sacrifice had a sound ideological base. Like the 
literati, Qing rulers upheld an orthodox neo-Confucian understanding of Heaven 
as transcendent and mystical. The mystic powers of Nature as symbolized by 
natural deities continued to hold ritual priority over the human deities. The 
fundamentals only started to change as Qing moved to its last decades.    
 
The Cosmic Revolution in Late Qing 
 
In the late nineteen century, the Qing Empire survived a tumultuous period of 
external crisis and domestic turbulence. The humiliating defeats in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894 and the Boxers War of 1900 had an immediate bearing 
on the legitimacy of Qing rulers. Meanwhile, even as late Qing state sacrifice as 
an institution remained more or less unchanged, perpetual decline had set in 
actual practice. Since the ascendency of physically frail Xianfeng in 1850, Qing 
emperors were either too weak or too young to personally perform the Grand 
Sacrifice; and even when they were able, rituals were interrupted by wars and 
social disorders. The decline is indicated by ritual regularity: whereas Daoguang 
attended in person all sacrifice to the Heaven at every winter solstice, Xianfeng 
only attended twice in eleven years, Tongzhi twice in thirteen years and 
Guangxu seventeen times in thirty years. 30  
A more profound challenge to the meaning of the rituals emerged with China’s 
encounter with modern science as the concept of Heaven was subject to ever 
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closer scrutiny from leading translators and thinkers. This challenge was best 
summarized in Yan Fu’s critique of the concept of Heaven: 
“The Chinese word tian (Nature) is what logic defines as an ambiguous term 
and thus most harmful to reasoning and susceptible to debates. It is God in 
theological terms but firmament in physical terms. In Western languages, there 
are different terms for the unmoved first mover (Logos) or the causal but 
unutterable divine will (Providence). But in Chinese common usage, they are 
all called Tian.”31  
Since Tian was put under the rigorous examination of logics, its disenchantment 
was inevitable.  Modern science already provided a theory not only for the 
physical tian in the guise of astronomy but also the theological tian in terms of 
Darwinism. In Yan Fu’s Tianyanlun (Theory of Natural Evolutions), a 
distortionary translation of Henry Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, he outright 
rejected the thrust of the author’s eclecticism about revolution and presented a 
variant of Spenserian Social Darwinism that unified the universe and human 
realm as one of evolutionary process.32  
Yan’s basic message soon attained almost axiomatic status among young 
intellectuals with sound neo-Confucian learning and some measure of western 
knowledge, when it reached them through Liang Qichao’s clarion call: “The 
struggle for survival is axiomatic for all living beings. In the struggle for 
survival, superior always wins and inferior always loses. This is an axiomatic 
                                                          
31 Yan Fu, Quanyan yiyi. Beijing: Commercial Press. 1981(1903)., p.298.   
32 Benjamin Schwartz. In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964. pp. 111-112. 
29 
 
ever since the beginning of life.”33 The success of popular social Darwinism in 
China was not accidental: it was at once the best representation of the Zeitgeist 
of an imperialistic era and a solution to the incoherence of neo-Confucian 
cosmic principle or li (理) and historical forces or shi （势）. Following Wang 
Hui’s illuminating analysis, the neo-Confucian formulation to symbolically 
subordinate the latter to the former through ritual and institutional contrivances 
had always been a perilous business; but in the axiomatic system in the words 
of Liang and his likes, the latter simply assumed the commanding and defining 
role. 34 
The direct consequence was demystification of Tian or Nature and its 
replacement by historical laws as Darwinian universal struggles in Late Qing 
cosmology. The ideological foundation of the Qing Empire was dealt a heavy 
blow. Since the universal struggles can only be fought at historical and 
collective level, collective units such as Nation and the People assumed the roles 
of historical actors as the dynastic Empires were relentlessly cast away. These 
collective actors in turn were associated with and represented by their human 
embodiments, namely, the heroes as the heralds of history. The most prominent 
representative was still Liang Qichao, who first introduced this Enlightenment 
mode of linear and nationalist history into China in rebuttal of traditional 
dynastic historiography.35  
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During the last decades of Qing rule, history in its national and heroic mode 
secured a growing hold on elite minds that was both intellectual and emotional. 
Even Emperor Guangxu, who would never fully agree with Liang’s later 
national histories, aired similar views on human powers in his personal writings, 
which are almost exclusively devoted to historical figures and events. In one of 
these commentaries, he criticized blind faith in Mandate of Heaven:  
“The theory of the Mandate only applies to the poor and the desperate….the rich 
and the powerful may not follow it blindly. Blind faith in the Mandate only leads 
to negligence and indolence in duty and arrogance and extravagance in conduct 
and there will certainly be no achievement. What an excellent argument of Li 
Mi that ‘all people can talk about mandates except the kings and ministers. King 
and ministers are the ones that make mandates’! This is indeed a prime 
ministerial insight!” He then went to censure a Tang emperor who interpreted 
the crisis of his time as willed by the Mandate of Heaven, arguing vociferously 
that the situation was purely caused and salvageable by human acts.” 36  
Born to an ordinary peasant family in provincial Guangdong, Sun was an 
extremely unlikely candidate to make the human Mandates envisioned by 
Guangxu. But his life took a dramatic turn when he was thirteen as he was 
exposed to Christianity and modern science in Hawaii and Hong Kong and 
drawn into Christian Chinese circles. He found his likeminded and formed an 
organization within the community of young Chinese Christians in Hong Kong, 
the Reviving China Society, amidst heavily Christianized rituals: members 
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swore their allegiance to the common cause by pointing one right hand to heaven 
and putting their left hand on Bible.37  
In 1896, the group failed in a plot to take Canton, and Sun’s close comrade, Lu 
Haodong, became the first martyr of the cause, while Sun had to sail to Japan 
under cover and spent the next fifteen years in Japan, Europe and the United 
States.38 As Sun was in London in 1896, he was cajoled and hijacked into the 
Qing Legation to be sent back and executed. But Sun managed to slip out a 
message to his former teacher, who then mobilized the press and even the British 
government for Sun’s release. The Qing Legation in London was eventually 
forced to give way under immense political pressure from the British.39  
The miraculous escape had a defining impact on Sun’s mind and his 
revolutionary career. In the days in custody, Sun could only find peace in 
incessant prayer. Heedful of his helplessness at the hands of the Qing legation, 
he could only wait for graces and miracles from God. 40 After his release, in his 
letter to Feng Xi, he attributed all his fortune to the Grace of God: “After I 
suffered this crisis, I feel like a wandering child returned home and a lost sheep 
found by the shepherd. This is all due to God’s Grace.”41  
Sun’s revolutionary enthusiasm was the best testimony to his Christian faith. 
With the faith to transform China, he dedicated the rest of his life to creating a 
new order, making every effort to recruit all possible supporters from foreign 
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adventurists, Japanese Pan-Asianists, overseas Chinese to various secret 
societies. None of these forces helped to realize his vision, but his image as the 
adamant revolutionary leader with a vision was firmly established. In 1903, 
Zhang Shizhao, writing with the pen name Huang Zhonghuang, already 
associated Sun with China’s salvation in a hugely popular biography of Sun: 
“Sun Yat-sen is not the name of a private individual but a new word discovered 
by a New China. There is hope for China only if there is a Sun Yat-sen…if the 
Heaven helps China, then the Sun the Monster must come forth (Yat-sen means 
the escaped god). Even if there were no Sun Yat-sen of the day, I know the 
shades and shadows of Sun would still enlighten this dark realm. …. We cannot 
talk about China without Sun Yat-sen and only Sun Yat-sen can revive China. 
Sun’s relation to China is like the relation between Krupp the name and Krupp 
the Gun. The two names are fused in one…” 42       
In Zhang’s characterization, the revolutionary leader is no longer just a person 
of blood and flesh, but also a metaphorical person associated with the vision of 
a new China. This vision was still vaguely in existence in the 1900s, as different 
revolutionary groups competed for the ultimate vision of revolution.  
1905 to 1924, Sun gradually formulated the sanminzhuyi (The Three Principles 
of the People), commonly translated as nationalism, the People’s rights and the 
People’s livelihood and published it as his last book in 1924. The doctrine itself 
was inspiring and coherent by his contemporaries.43 But the point of Sun’s last 
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writing was the presentation of these ideas as a vision, rather than the ideas. In 
this book entitled Sanminzhuyi, Sun also provided a historical logic for the zhuyi:  
“What is sanmin zhuyi (The Three Principles of the People)? Put in simplest 
terms, Sanmin zhuyi is the idea of national salvation. What is the Idea (zhuyi)? 
Zhuyi is a type of idea, a kind of belief and a sort of power. In general, whenever 
humans investigate the principles of a thing, the first thing that comes to our 
mind is thought. When thoughts get coherent, there is the belief. And power 
arises from belief. Thus zhuyi evolves from thought to belief, from belief to 
power and eventually gets established in the world…. Once you believe in 
sanmin zhuyi, the Idea will generate mighty power and this power will save 
China…”44 
In other words, the zhuyi is the social gospel that promises salvation in the future 
through faith and sacrifice, which in cognate with revolution.  Like the Gospel 
for salvation, it attains a religious sacredness and demands sacrifice from the 
believers. Compared with all earlier expressions of ideology, the defining 
feature of zhuyi, as Ivo Spira identified, is its focus on the future and the purpose 
to make history. 45 In other words, it is about “a vision that can be realized 
through historical act in spite of the self”, or an act of self-sacrifice. While Sun’s 
vision was but one of the many, buttressed by Christian faith and belief in 
science, it proved to be more unambiguous and powerful.  
 
Rulership Sacrifice Transformed 
                                                          
44  Sun Yat-sen, “Sanmin zhuyi”, Guofu Quanji, Qin Xiaoyi ed, Taipei: Jindai 
Zhongguo chubanshe, p.1 
45 Ivo Spira, “A Conceptual History of Isms: The Modernization of Ideological 




In 1905, the Qing court finally decided under tremendous pressure to embark 
on radical reform on its basic cultural constitution. In April, the court abolished 
the vital institutional link between the state and the society, the Civil Service 
Examination, and replaced it with a new degree system based on schooling. In 
1906, the court made the exceptional move to elevate the Middle Sacrifice to 
Confucius to the rank of Grand Sacrifice on a par with Heaven, Earth and the 
imperial ancestors.46 While this act did not lead to complete disenchantment of 
Nature, it acknowledged the historical figure of Confucius as an alternative 
source of transcendence. A ritual parity between history and cosmos was 
achieved. But these ritual gestures were too late as the imperial order began to 
unravel in the 1910s.   
The last sacrifice to Heaven at the Altar to Heaven in Beijing was performed 
not by a Qing emperor but by Yuan Shikai on winter solstice of 1913. The 
carefully reformed rituals proved to be unsuccessful due to many reasons: the 
ritual site was already desacralized and the evocation of imperial symbolisms 
raised doubts among many critiques.47  The ritual spectacle became such a 
disaster that neither Yuan nor his successor dared to repeat it again. 48 
While Yuan Shikai’s true attitudes to ritual sacrifice were unknown, it was clear 
that he opted for continuation of late Qing reforms. This rationale worked well 
as long as ritual remained marginal to Yuan’s realpolitik. But once Yuan used 
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these rituals and especially the sacrifice to Heaven for his emperorship project, 
he was under severe attack from all sides. In the midst of a weakening central 
state and changing social mentality, their symbolic powers had been in terminal 
decline and lost much of their appeal to the new political elites. 
There is possibly a more sympathetic reading of Yuan’s ritual gestures. Personal 
ambitions aside, Yuan’s reintroduction of emperorship was a response to the 
crisis of the day. In his original conception, emperorship could help to 
consolidate power and control over the diverse political forces. As the plan 
failed, Yuan had to take direct personal responsibility. In his Decree on 
Abolishing Emperorship, he had to make a sincere apology for the moral failing 
of overriding the People’s rights: 
“My sincerity is not enough to move people and my sagacity not adequate to 
illuminate affairs. Since this is indeed due to my lack of virtue, what is there to 
complain about others! I have brought pain to my people and toil to my soldiers, 
leaving the public sentiments in confusion and commerce in decline. Looking 
into the depth of the heart, I am really fearful. What do have I to care for myself 
in order to submit myself to the will of others (public opinion)?”49   
Regardless of the sincerity of his pronouncement, Yuan maintained adherence 
to the neo-Confucian ideal of emperor. After the failed attempt of emperorship, 
Yuan took personal moral responsibility for any misfortunes befallen his realm. 
This moral rule of self-cultivation and its acknowledgement of the ruler’s 
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imperfectability make a sharp distinction with Sun Yatsen’s image as the 
sacrificial and visionary leader. 
Yuan’s ritual conservatism was also no match for Sun Yat-sen’s radical 
approach to political rituals. In 1914, Sun Yat-sen already became the leader of 
the militant opposition to Yuan. While he was never successful in overthrowing 
Yuan and his military successors, his ritual response to the political chaos of the 
1910s was somewhat more original. Instead of relying on time-honored 
sacrifices to rally hearts and minds, Sun employed these rituals only 
sporadically. In 1912, when he became the first provisional president of the 
Republic of the China, he performed sacrifice to the Ming founder at the 
Mausoleum of Emperor Hongwu and sent deputies to sacrifice to the common 
ancestor of the Chinese People, the Yellow Emperor or Huangdi.50  
Sun only retained two important rituals from China’s recent past: oath-taking 
from late Qing secret societies and sacrifice to martyrs from Qing state sacrifice. 
The survival of these two were not accidental: both as minimally cosmic rituals 
can be easily remolded into something close to modern Western practices.  
Sun took the oath-taking ceremony directly from secret society and 
reformulated along the line of Western oath of citizenship. This requires, among 
others, removal of all its mystical symbolisms and universalistic trappings. 
Citizenship oath ceremony is superior, according to Sun, since it is the 
“fundamental procedure in civilized states ruled by law”, and for states 
undergoing constitutional reform, “all citizens must take oath as a token of 
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approval and those who refuse the oath will be regarded as enemies and 
exiled”.51 But merely aligning with citizenship oath was not enough. Sun also 
introduced pledges of loyalty to himself. In 1915, Sun made it mandatory for 
new members of the newly established Revolutionary Party to take an oath of 
allegiance to himself as leader and added their finger prints as testimony.52  
The sacrifice to martyrs was the only important sacrifice that the new sacrificial 
system directly inherited from the Qing. Obviously, martyrs were sanctified 
only as human agents of the making of history. Upon his assumption of office, 
Sun Yat-sen bestowed honorary titles on some of his closest martyred comrades. 
Of all these state-level sacrifices to martyrs, the national sacrifice to the 
Seventy-Two Martyrs of Huanghuagang received the most systematic state 
support and was attended by Sun Yat-sen himself. Sun did not only attend the 
first opening ceremony of the state cemetery on 15 May 1912, but doled out of 
his private pockets to the families of the martyred. 53 Moreover, the martyrs who 
died for anti-Manchu cause was gradually transformed and became incorporated 
in the Nationalist historiography in the 1925 as a coherent group of 
revolutionaries who “sacrificed for The People’s Principles and the Five Power 
Constitutions”. 54   
As with the new oath-taking, what was unique in the new martyr rituals was the 
rejection of ritual universalism. In the Qing ritual sacrifice after Qianlong, Ming 
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loyalists like Shi Kefa and Yuan Chonghuan were also made part of the state 
pantheon in compliance with the Qing Empire’s universalistic claims to 
Confucian values of loyalty. But for the Nationalists, the martyred Qing 
loyalists of the revolution were pure villains with no share in sacrificial rituals. 
Thus Republican martyrdom was a variant of Christian martyrdom rather than 
Confucian martyrdom: it served in principle to clearly demarcate the self and 
other.  
Sun’s remaking of ritual sacrifice was not restricted to borrowings from the past. 
Historical practices of sacrifice were only continued as long as they were useful 
for his higher political goals of history-making. Far more important were the 
new rituals that symbolically turned the words of zhuyi into a reality in future. 
But this would need a reversal of the logic of ritual sacrifice in imperial China. 
In the old context, ritual sacrifice simply commemorates an act of sacrifice. In 
the new context, ritual sacrifice becomes the immediate initiation to everyday 
acts of sacrifice. As the logic of sacrifice was reversed, the ritual texts or the 
plans that initiated future sacrifice became critical. 
The first such ritual text in modern China was Sun’s Jianguo fanglue (Plan for 
National Building), published in three parts between 1917 and 1920. In a drastic 
redefinition of the Qing genre, Sun identified fanglue as a plan to realize his 
vision of China’s future. As such, Sun’s fanglue is no longer a historical 
postscript to confirm the Mandate of Heaven for the ruler as in the Qing imperial 
historiography. The tensions between the Qing transcendental principle and 
historical trends were dissolved in fanglue since the plan itself was an extended 
outline of a future vision whose realization was dependent on the will and the 
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faith in zhuyi. This essentially ritual and scriptural function of Sun’s fanglue is 
evident in its structures and arguments.  
The first part of jianguo fanglue, psychological construction, introduces Sun’s 
philosophy of history:  Xingyi Zhinan (To act is easier than to know). The stated 
purpose of this theory was to dispel the people’s doubt about the difficulties of 
putting his plan into action.55 According to the new theory, since it is much 
harder to know than to act on the future, the visionary who provides ideals and 
plans are rightly superior to the executioners of the plans, who are in turn better 
than those who are ignorant of the ideals and plans. As Sun argues, “in their 
admiration for pragmatists and contempt for idealists, those Chinese lacking in 
foresights are like chemists who valued the sellers of bean curd over Pasteur and 
Berthelot.”  
At the level of inquiry, Sun’s comparisons between the logic of every act in 
history and the logic of scientific discoveries are of dubious validity. But the 
point of theorizing knowledge and action is not about relative epistemological 
priorities of xing and zhi as they are actually played out in history. Instead, it is 
to reinvent the category of historical action (xing) as planned procedure 
subordinate to historical truth (zhi). The theory thus serves to justify Sun’s 
philosophy of history as manifestation of his zhuyi. The apparent inspiration for 
Sun is an idealized view of scientific projects: once there is scientific knowledge 
to form a plan, everything can be materialized. 56      
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The second part of the fanglue is a plan for China’s industrial development. 
There are six sub-plans, each focusing on one aspect of the development. In 
most general terms, this part of the plan is about a systematic transformation of 
China’s natural and human geography through science and technology. The plan 
is so daring and forward-looking in scale and scope that it still retains some 
relevance even today. In fact, almost a century later, the current Chinese state 
has only realized a fraction of his specific goals.57 Sun was also aware of his 
over-ambitiousness, as he advises readers to read it only as “a grand strategy for 
industrial development” rather than a realistic action plan, whereas detailed 
plans of implementation should be drafted by expert and planners. 58 
The third part is a plan for the realization of the People’s right. But far from a 
strategy to achieve his goal, this work is a detailed procedure for the future 
People’s Congress. It provides minute instruction for procedures for emending 
laws, making exceptions and impeaching officials. Sun was highly aware of the 
nature of his text as a script for future enactment as he exhorts the readers to 
read the book as a “drill book for infantry” and “chemical formulas for 
experiments” rather than a self-contained theory.59 According to him, the book 
is not meant for simple reading and recitation, like Confucius text: “if you only 
read and recite, this book will be prosaic and you will learn nothing. But if you 
use it as a handbook for drills and experiments, you will gradually form a better 
                                                          
57 Zhou Haibing, “Sun Zhongshan he tade shiyejihua”, in Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan. 
2010. No.39, pp.3-5 
58 Jianguo Fanglue, p.123 
59 Sun’s text was constructed as script to be ritualized for his followers, which involves 
“sacralisation of the texts and institutionalization of sanminzhuyi” in learning sessions, 
Party Congress and other political rituals. I borrowed the idea from Apter and Saich’s 
characterization of Mao’s political ritual during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign. 
C.f. David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic, MA: 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 304-307. 
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appreciation of the book and understand all the nuances of people’s assemblies 
(the People’s Congress).”60  
The initiation of Sun’s script would await the ritual that made it into the action 
plan of the reinvented Nationalist Party, which only came into being on 23 
January 1924, on its first Party Congress. During this ten-day event, 165 
participants from all over the Chinese world discussed Sun’s plans, the Party 
Constitutions and other important political agenda. 61  Among the numerous 
planning meetings that would characterize “party life” in modern Chinese 
politics, the Party Congress is the most central and prestigious of all Party rituals. 
Sun summarizes the ritual functions of Party Congress nicely in his closing 
speech to the First Party Congress. As Sun suggested, the central aim of the 
Congress was to “realize sanmin zhuyi and make the words into reality”, by 
“making a comprehensive plan, coordinating the action of our comrades and 
deciding on Party discipline.” 62  Thus the Congress functioned as ritual 
initiation into the everyday life sacrifice of Party members: as Sun compares the 
Party’s struggle with war, “the Congress is military planning” and the purpose 
is “to engage in struggles” with what the deputies took home from the Congress, 
namely, the spiritual ammunition of sanmin zhuyi.63  
Planning, oath-taking, sacrifice to martyrs and the Party Congress constituted 
most important elements of the paraphernalia of new political rituals. Compared 
with Qing cosmic rituals, these new rituals had an immanent and powerful effect 
                                                          
60 Jianguo Fanglue. p. 340 
61 Chen Xiqi (ed.), Sunzhongshan nianpu changbian. (Extended Chronicles of Sun 
Yatsen’s Life) Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. 1990., pp.1801-1802.  
62 Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan xuanji, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985, p.610   
63 Ibid, p.613 
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on everyday life similar to the early Christian Church. For one thing, the ritual 
distance between the ruler and the subjects no long existed. An average Party 
member could pledge allegiance to Sun Yat-sen simply by learning the ritual 
texts and making an oath in one’s heart without attending the Congress. For 
another, while the national-level plans were made at the Party Congress, anyone 
could contribute to its execution as long as he shared the visions and engaged in 
earnest work.  
Conclusion: Implications of the New Rulership Sacrifice  
 
On the eve of Sun’s death in 1925, a new system of ritual sacrifice associated 
with rulership was already formally in place in the small party-state enclave of 
Guangdong. Under this new system, the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) was 
replaced by a historical vision (zhuyi), while the People or the Nation formally 
assumed the ritual equivalent of the Heaven and the Party’s Congress sacrifice 
to the Nature.64 The modern Chinese ruler, in his capacity as chief planner, 
leader or chairman, still plays a critical role as the mediator between human 
world and the unknown cosmological realm of future, through the act of 
committing human and non-human resources to a collective vision. All 
resources that were committed to this vision effectively function as sacrifice, 
including but not restricted to the willing human agents, such as revolutionary 
martyrs who voluntarily laid down their lives for zhuyi.  
                                                          
64 Sun Yat-sen formally defined the People as ultimate objective of the Party’s 
sacrifice in his concluding remark to the Party Congress. C.f. Sun Yat-sen, Sun 
Zhongshan xuanji, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985, p.611   
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The new sacrificial system has become “modern” in so far as the natural deities 
were completely purged from rulership sacrifice. But nature as natural resources 
was in fact mobilized on unprecedented scales for nation-building through 
numerous plans like Jianguo fanglue. As in Latour’s Second Great Divide, 
nature involved in modernization was purified in the history act of creating 
society.65 In modern Chinese usage, the official term for sacrifice (xisheng or 
fengxian) is reserved for martyrs and revolutionaries, the only historical 
worthies for state ritual sacrifice, since their sacrifice is considered as the sine 
non qua for the happiness of the People and the development of the nation. The 
modern rulers as leaders and saviors are now attributed the highest sacrifice. But 
his sacrifice or contribution, ironically, requires even less sacrifice than Qing 
emperors: it is his divination of and dedication to the sacred vision of future that 
warrants his supremacy, not martyrdom or sacrifice that legitimizes the ruler, in 
accordance with the principle of putting idea ahead of practice (zhinan xingyi).   
This economy of sacrifice leads to a monstrous development: cult of personality. 
This is a major break from China’s imperial past. Unlike Roman emperors and 
Christian rulers, Chinese emperors were human persons who ruled by the 
Mandate of Heaven. Hong Xiuquan made a bold attempt in direction of 
Christianization by directly claiming divine descent from God, but failed to 
establish a historical precedence for later regimes. Sun Yat-sen, certainly a more 
devout Christian than Hong, proved to be more successful in bringing elements 
of Christian political theology into Chinese political rituals. By setting up a 
vision in future and offering himself a messianic status, the sacred personality 
                                                          
65 Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. MA, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1993, pp.98-99 
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of the leader was forever bonded with the political life of his visions. Even as 
his physical body was interred, his political body as founder of the Party and 


















                                                  Chapter Two 
Qi and Jingshen:  
The Making of Modern Chinese Spirit of Sacrifice, 1895-1930 
 
The Concepts of Spirit in Modern China  
In the last chapter, I discussed the transformation of sacrifice as discursive 
context of political rituals. It can be traced to the gradual disenchantment of the 
ancient cosmology as the sacred in political rituals as it was gradually replaced 
by a sacred mode of temporality. The long process suddenly gained the 
momentums in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when new ideas and 
practices from the West dealt a death blow to the legitimacy of the universal 
empire.  
But this discussion of rituals would never be complete without a further 
examination into notion of spirits, which was key to all forms of religious and 
political rituals. Indeed, a further discussion of the spirits would enlarge our 
inquiry from politics to the realm of popular ideology and even everyday life. 
In this chapter, I shall broaden the discussion into this more important discursive 
domain of spirituality.  But before I began to construct a genealogy of Chinese 
spirits, it is useful first to examine the three essential terms that ordinarily 
constituted the basic building-blocks of the Chinese spiritual world. 
Among the words that translate spirit in modern Chinese, Jingshen (精神) is 
perhaps the best known and least understood. In its modern usage, jingshen is 
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most often associated with essential messages and mental activities. Thus one 
can talk about the essence of the Chinese culture (zhongguowenhua de jingshen), 
the central message of a Party Congress (dangdaihui jingshen), spiritual 
civilization (jingshen wenming), and the spirit of sacrifice (xisheng jingshen), 
spiritual level (jingshen jingjie) or a spiritual appearance (jingshen mianmao). 
It is also closely related to the idea of national essence (guocui) and psychiatric 
disorders (jingshen bing). While most of these different shades of meaning 
either denote abstract concepts or mental process, only the last one (jingshen 
mianmao) retains the original sense of the classical word, which usually 
describes external, especially facial expressions of spiritedness. The latter use 
still dominates the language of everyday life, whereas other meanings of 
jingshen find their frequent uses in political propaganda, textbooks and history.  
An older and equally important spiritual concept is ling (靈), a shamanistic term 
passed down more or less unscathed from the oracle bones.66 In most cases, ling 
is best translated as exterior spirit, such as the Holy Spirit (shengling), the soul 
(linghun), divine revelation (xianling), ghost (youling) and evil spirit (xieling). 
But ling can also refer to efficacy within or without a religious context, usually 
involving magical acts or formulae. It also finds frequent use in everyday cultic 
worship, sacrificial rituals, divinations, medicine and even practical skills. In 
contrast to jingshen, ling is seldom used in official media, history and politics. 
Evoked officially, it has a negative connotation of zongjiao mixin (religion and 
superstition) or problematic spirit to be managed or controlled. While jingshen 
                                                          
66 According to Shuowen Jiezi, ling is constructed as the image of a shaman offering 
jades in a sacrificial ritual to gods. Its original meaning is thus to serve God with jade. 
C.f. Xu Shen. Shuowen Jiezi, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. 1998., p.13.   
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is non-material in a transcendent sense, ling cannot be separated from the 
material world by virtue of the requisite ritual sacrifices and magical formulas.    
Meanwhile, the classical Chinese concept of qi (氣), which used to encompass 
jingshen and intermingle with ling, has lost all its political and much of its 
intellectual appeal but is still very much alive in everyday life. As a universal 
cosmic element, qi is neither spiritual nor material: it only recognizes vertical 
divisions of different qi in terms of its spiritual quality, rather than categorical 
divisions between spirit and matter. For over two millennia, qi has been the 
central concept for moral, spiritual and bodily cultivation shared by 
Confucianism, Taoism and a wide array of cosmological practices. In late 
imperial China, it was in an uneasy balance with the shamanistic ling. While qi 
was upheld by intellectual and political elites, it had never been able to 
completely subjugate ling. In modern China, as vertical integrity of qi gave way 
to the vertical division of spirit (jingshen) and matter (wuzhi) in the official 
discourse, qi survives only as an auxiliary to spirituality.         
The history of early twentieth-century Chinese spirit was a history of tension 
and accommodation between a rising jingshen spirituality of elites and state 
ideology, qi-centered cosmological practices and shamanistic spiritual 
traditions. Some aspects of tensions and adaptations have been the focus of 
studies in recent decade revolving around the religious problem. For example, 
Rebecca Nedostup makes extensive survey of the Nationalist government’s 
effort to separate out religion and superstition in the public domain, an effort 
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that was doomed, since religion remained critical to the affective regime in 
Chinese society.67  
A more ambitious project by Vincent Grossaert and David A. Palmer enlarges 
the religious landscape to survey an even wider range of spiritual phenomena in 
modern China, including redemptive societies, secularized traditions and 
political rituals under the umbrella term religion. While recognizing the tensions 
and accommodations between state and religion, they also stress the importance 
of religious innovations which enabled the field to remain open and produce 
new forms throughout the twentieth century. 68 
A problem of the state-religion or secular-spiritual approach is the blind spots it 
leaves behind, namely, areas of conceptual intersection and exclusion. The 
former includes spiritual aspects of the jingshen-centered self-sacrifice and 
cultivation for certain groups, such as revolutionary soldiers and martyrs. The 
latter includes an array of qi-centered cosmological practices from numerology 
to martial arts, which has been in a process of internal transformations and 
external interactions with other cosmologies, including Christian eschatology, 
modern science and capitalism. In both cases, important changes were under the 
way in early twentieth century. The state-religion or secular-spiritual framework, 
however enlarged and elaborated, tends to exclude these themes as non-
religious or misidentify them simply as modern and secular. In order to grasp 
                                                          
67 Rebecca Nedostup. Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese 
Modernity. MA, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2009., pp.272-277 
68 Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer. The Religious Question in Modern China. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011, pp.395-396. 
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the general spiritual trend in modern China, a re-conceptualization of modern 
Chinese spirituality is required.  
Recently, Peter van der Veer provides a much needed conceptualization of the 
modern spirit of Indian and China. In his comparative study of the concepts of 
spirit in modern China and India, van der Veer highlights the importance of 
imperial interactions in the production of religion, spirituality and the secular, 
which he refers to as “atheism” in China. 69 Although van der Veer is aware of 
the differences between Christianity and Chinese religiosities, the application 
of secular/spiritual to modern Chinese still reveals a degree of unwarranted 
euro-centrism. For example, the modern Chinese concept of spirit or jingshen is 
almost always associated with abstract ideas and mental processes, rather than 
religious or spirituality as defined in Christian and secular languages. It is 
problematic to assume such a dichotomy of secular/religion or secular/spiritual 
and a parallel process of secularization in modern Chinese spiritual 
transformation.  
A better case for the spiritual transformation in modern China can be made 
without the dichotomy of religion and secularism. As recent studies have shown, 
the idea of religion as Enlightenment construct has limited application in non-
West traditions in their original formulation.70 Instead of religion and secular, 
                                                          
69 Peter van der Veer. The Spiritual and the secular in China and India. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 2013., pp.223-227.  
70 C.f. Tomoko Mazuzawa. The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 2012; Talal Asad. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 





we may focus on the changing concepts and practices of spirit as old Chinese 
ideas and practices encountered modern science, evangelical Protestantism and 
philosophy.  
By tracing the evolution of the Chinese spirit, it is possible to develop a better 
understanding about the origin and nature of modern Chinese spirit, especially 
the new spirit of jingshen. Rather than secularization, it is the product of 
interiorization, a process centered on cosmology rather than religious reform, or 
what I define as the transformation of sacrifice. Ling and jingshen corresponds 
closely to ritual and moral sacrifice that I discuss in chapter one, whereas qi is 
associated with the equally important practice of self-cultivation which I discuss 
in chapter three.  
The scale of a single chapter naturally forbids me to elaborate on the complexity 
of religiosity or spirituality in modern China. Instead, I shall restrict my sketch 
to a short genealogy of jingshen and the process of interiorization that 
accompanies the emergence of this new spirit. As the most interior of all 
Chinese spiritual concepts, the concept of jingshen is emblematic of the 
conceptual transformation of sacrifice, a process initiated by pre-Qin thinkers in 
the Axial Age. 71 Through an examination on the evolution of jingshen, we can 
understand the transformation of sacrifice from a unique vantage point. 
                                                          
71 The Axial Age here is defined as the period from 8th century BCE to 3rd century 
BCE, or the extended periods of Spring Autumn and Warring State. It is defined by 
Karl Jasper as a period when philosophers, thinkers and prophets in Persia, India, the 
Sinosphere and the Greco-Roman world developed more or less independently new 
mode of metaphysical and ethical thoughts, all of which would have an definitive and 
enduring impact on the formation of these civilizations. For Jasper’s original 
definition, see Karl Jaspers, Michael Bullock (translate) , The Origin and Goal of 




Qi and Jingshen in Pre-modern China 
 
For two thousand years, the most encompassing concept for spirit and matter in 
Chinese has been qi, rendered variously as vital energy, cosmic element or life 
power. Considered as universal across the human, the heavenly and the material 
realm, qi was the fundamental element of Confucian and Taoist cosmos.  
Qi had its beginning in Early China. In the late Shang shamanistic universe, qi 
was initially conceptualized as the common elements that constituted wind, 
earthly spirit of fertility and human inspiration.72 But in pre-Qin times, the idea 
underwent a major transformation and acquired a central position in 
cosmologies of pre-Qin thinkers. As argued by Yu Yingshih, the pre-Qin idea 
of qi was created at a time when the shamanistic universe was partially 
disenchanted and incorporated into a new cosmic system of qi. The transition 
spanned a millennium between late Shang and early Han, during much of the 
time the importance of shamanism gradually declined. Although the new 
cosmos was dominated by a transcendent realm of tian (天) and the universal 
cosmic element of qi, traces of the old shamanistic system were still well-
observed in Axial philosophical and literary texts.73  
                                                          
relationship between all these pre-modern and modern terms, please refer to the 
appendix on Chinese spiritual terms. 
72 Togawa Yoshio, “Kokotsumoji to kinbun ni mieru ki” (Qi in Oracle Bones and 
Bronze Inscriptions), in Kozawa Seichi, ed: Chugoku ni okeru shizenkan to ningenkan 
no tenkai (The Idea of Qi: Development of the Idea of Nature and Human in China). 
Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 1983, pp.27-28.   
73 Yu Yingshih, Lun Tian Ren Zhi Ji (On the Relation between the Transcendence and 
the Human Realm). Taipei: Linking Books. 2014, pp.135-142. It needs to be noted here 
Yu Yingshih articulates a slightly different version of the Axial Breakthrough or Axial 
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The rise of qi in pre-Qin China was thus symptomatic of the first stage in the 
interiorization of spirit in the Chinese civilization, a process that Yu defines as 
interior transcendence, in contrast to the exterior transcendence of other axial 
civilizations, which is based on an Archimedean point external to human world, 
such as Platonic eidos or other concepts of the ideal order in ancient Greek 
thoughts.74  
Jingshen was part of the Chinese vocabulary created with the new cosmology 
of qi at the end of axial transformation. It was first conceived as a special type 
of qi with a spiritual quality. While the term was already in use in early Taoist 
texts like Zhuangzi and Laotze, the most systematic definition of jingshen was 
provided by Huainanzi. In the Treatise on Jingshen, jingshen is described as a 
heavenly qi that animates human body, in contrast to the physical xingti 
(physical body) or guhai (skeletal system) that forms the material body. In 
Huainanzi system, jingshen plays a critical role in self-cultivation in the 
cosmology of Huainanzi, since sagehood is conditioned on the proper 
preservation of jingshen within the body. 75   
Although the axial transformation brought forth qi and jingshen, it was more of 
an intellectual breakthrough than a full-fledged conceptual transformation as the 
new cosmic element of qi never supplanted and only existed alongside with 
                                                          
Transformation. In the classical formulation of Jasper and his successors, the 
transformation was characterized by a new realm of transcendence above and beyond 
the human realm, whereas Yu argues for an inner transcendence in the Chinese case, 
where the new realm of transcendent was identified with the mind or the inner 
consciousness. For Yu’s comparison with other Axial traditions, especially the Greeks, 
see  Lun Tian Ren Zhi Ji, pp.71-85.   
74 Ibid. pp.219-228.  
75 John S. Mayor. The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government 
in Early Han China. New York: Columbia University Press. 2010, pp.238-243.  
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shamanistic spirit.76 Indeed, Han state Confucianism provided ling a recognized 
place in the state ideology and sacrifice, following the principle of shendao 
shejiao (神道設教), the idea that the state needs not reject shamanistic spirit 
while employing them as tools for coercion and control through state sanctioned 
local sacrifices.  
From the late Han to the Song Dynasty, the Chinese spiritual systems underwent 
another major interiorization in its millennium-long encounter with Mahayana 
Buddhism, culminating in the neo-Confucian reformulation of qi and the new 
transcendent realm of li (理). During the syncretiszation of post-Axial Chinese 
and Buddhist spiritualties, both traditions had to make significant compromises. 
The Chinese Buddhists envisioned an imperishable element or an essence for 
every sentient being by borrowing concepts from Taoism, including jingshen 
which now meant an imperishable essence in human life. 77  For the neo-
Confucians, the most important change from their older doctrine included the 
more transcendent realm and the interior space (心) for human being with 
multiple layers of consciousness.78  
                                                          
76 The classical example for this syncretic spirit was Dong Zhongshu’s concept of qi in 
a telepathic cosmology, which maintains that human spirit interacts with the 
cosmological qi. The thesis contained some remnants from old shamanism, as the tian 
(heaven) was still conceived as having a divine personality and the qi still served as a 
spiritual medium between human and this supernatural being.  
77 C.f. Jungnok Park. How Buddhism Acquired a Soul on the Way to China. Sheffield: 
Equipnox Publisher. 2012, pp.177-194.   
78 The foundation of this inner depth was already laid down in the axial transformation, 
when the mind (心) replaced shamanist body as the new access point to the sacred. But 
the post-axial mind had no inherent source and potential for cultivation until Buddhist 
proto-psychology invested it with a structured inner depth with the embedded alaya 
consciousness or Buddha Nature.  
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The neo-Confucian cosmos centered on qi represented a further interiorization 
of the post-axial system in two important ways. First, Buddhist proto-
psychological analysis of human consciousness deepened the Chinese mind. 
The idea of the mind as an interior domain with potential for self-cultivation 
provided a foundation for Confucian moral cultivation. Moreover, the Buddhist 
cosmic concepts of karma and dharma also provide a powerful platform for 
conceiving the cosmos in non-shamanistic and more rationalist ways. In popular 
religion, karmic causality was doubly important as the basis for everyday moral 
practice in late imperial China. 
But there were still unresolved contradictions in the neo-Confucian synthetic 
spirit. While qi was mostly conceived as non-spiritual cosmic element, it also 
had a spiritual or mystical function to access transcendence. Yet being spiritual 
and mystical, it could not be conceptually distinguished from ling, the 
shamanistic spirit that promised manipulation of supernatural powers. As a 
result, literati in late imperial China often upheld the principle that 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism coalesced into one creed with 
Confucianism as the central pillar, underlying qi-dominated spirituality that 
invariably included some shamanistic elements. 79  
Moreover, the official line of shendao shejiao also enabled the shamanistic spirit 
of ling to access transcendent tian, with powerfully subversive implications. 
                                                          
79  For example, Matteo Ricci, who arrived in China in 1583, made the following 
observation: “Most of them openly admit that they have no religion, and so by 
deceiving themselves in pretending to believe (as many as possible), the generally fall 
into the deepest depths of utter atheism”. C.f. Matteo Ricci, “Religious Sects among 
the Chinese”, in Mattew Ricci, translated by Louis J. Gallagher, China in the Sixteenth 




Throughout the era of Confucian orthodoxy, it became an established model for 
sectarian rebels to forge a syncretic spirit based on powerful shamanistic spirit 
and various sects of Buddhism, Manichaeism and eventually Christianity in 
their bids for the Mandate the Heaven and their mobilizations of the grassroots 
for political revolutions.80    
Many late-imperial thinkers sought to rationalize qi and dissociate it from ling. 
Most relevant to the discussion of jingshen was a formulation by the 
seventeenth-century Confucian thinker Wang Fuzhi, a Ming loyalist who spent 
most of his life in self-banishment in early Qing. Wang proposed a theory of qi 
as the sole constitutive element of both cosmic process and social life, making 
li second-order to qi as its patterns or regularities. In Wang’s vision, both cosmic 
process and human history are essentially transformation and transfiguration of 
various qi. By making qi material and li inherent in material process, Wang 
sought to eradicate the source of mysticism and launch a final attack on all 
shamanistic elements.   
Though often labelled as progenitor of modern Chinese materialism, Wang was 
in fact keenly aware of the risk of naïve materialism, which usually has 
difficulty in explaining human consciousness and in providing a foundation for 
morality. To this end, Wang reinvented the concept of shen (god or spirit神) as 
a regulatory property of qi. As he comments on Zhang Zai, a Northern Song 
progenitor of Neo-confucian doctrines: 
                                                          
80 Suzuki Chyōsei. Chūgokuni okeru shūkyō to gakumei (Religion and Revolution in 
Chinese History). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 1997., pp.297-303.  
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“In the Great Harmony (Taihe), there are both qi and shen. Shen is none other 
than the principle of clear communication between yang and yin. Shen, which 
is not representable, is inherent in the image of Great Harmony. The Great 
Harmony is the coherence of yin and yang as well as qi and shen. But after man 
is born and communicates with the material world, qi goes after materials and 
the individual is driven by qi while leaving behind shen. It is far from the origin 
condition of life when shen is driven by qi and misses its fluidity and vitality.”81 
Wang Fuzhi’s shen is not transcendent but co-existent with qi. As Wang argues, 
“Shen is the spirit (ling) of qi. If shen is inherent in qi and unifies with it, it is 
still shen. Visible when concentrated, invisible when dispersed, how could this 
form be incoherent and unreal! Thus the shen of Yao and Shun (Sage King) and 
the qi of Jie and Zhou (evil ruler) still exist and remain unchanged till today.”82 
Wang is also not amiss to the supernatural spirit of gui (ghost) as part of 
shamanistic spirit of ling. Like many materialists, he tries to reduce it to material: 
“The property that enables heavenly qi to be embodied in the person and 
perform its transformations is called shen; when human life expires and qi 
disperses and returns (to the Heaven and Earth), it is called gui (ghost).”83  
The critical contribution of Wang Fuzhi’s cosmology is the idea of spirit (shen) 
as a form or pattern of qi, an interior spirit in a materialistic universe and a 
striking parallel to the various scientific laws in contemporary Western 
cosmologies. But his ideas were never widespread in print and exerted no 
influence on mainstream Qing scholarship until well into the second half of 
                                                          
81 Wang Fuzhi, Zhangzi zhengmeng pian zhu,.Beijing: Guji Chubanshe. 1956, p.2.  
82 Ibid.p.7. 
83 Ibid. p.16. 
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nineteenth century.84 Despite tensions between qi and ling, the urge to create a 
new spirit over and above qi and banish shamanistic ling was never strong 
enough during much of the Qing.  
But with the great transformation of the nineteenth century, the situation 
changed radically. The crisis to the Chinese spirit came to a head in the 1890s 
with the full-scale onslaught of Christianity and modern science: Christianity 
presented an alternative to the Chinese transcendent, whereas modern science 
presented a new conception of the material world to the detriment of the 
integrity of qi. As Qing intellectuals began to seek alternative spiritual 
foundations for the empire outside orthodox neo-Confucianism, Wang Fuzhi 
loomed large in the intellectual horizon of the Confucian elites like a prophetic 
sage, as his scholarship became known to and embraced by leading literati-
officials like Zeng Guofan. 85 In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
Wang’s theory of qi became immensely popular among the young generation, 
especially the intellectuals associated with Hunan Reform of 1898, who found 
in him an inspiration for ambitious reform plans modelled after the West.86   
 
The Invention of Jingshen  
 
                                                          
84 C.f. Liu Zhisheng, Liu Ping. Wang Chuanshan zhuzuo congkao (Collected Studies 
on the Work of Wang Fuzhi). Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe. 1998., pp.55-71.  
85 Hu Weiping, “Zeng Guofan he quanshan yishu” (Zeng Guofan and the posthumous 
collection of Wang Fuzhi’s work), in Wang Jipin, Li Dajian. Zeng Guofan yu 
jindaizhongguo (Zeng Guofan and Modern China). Changsha: Yuelu shushe. 2007, 
p.11.  
86  Stephen R. Platt. Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China. MA, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2009, pp.88-92.  
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At the turn of the century, theories of modern science and especially the theory 
of evolution introduced by Yan Fu’s Tianyanlun (On the Evolution of Nature) 
provided the much needed theoretical reinforcements to Wang Fuzhi’s 
cosmology and Buddhist elements in neo-Confucian thought. These schools of 
thought had some inherent rationalistic elements, such as the causality of karma, 
the deep alaya consciousness and the materialistic property of qi, albeit only at 
a metaphysical level.  
What modern science offered was the critical causal links between the claims 
of Buddhist metaphysics and a coherent theory. This fateful coupling explained 
why many young intellectuals well-versed in Wang’s rediscovered works were 
easily converted to elementary scientific laws and even Christian Science.87 
Under the spell of Buddhism, Wang Fuzhi’s proto-materialism and modern 
science, they were easily moved by their structural similarities to construct 
syncretic cosmologies. Among these young scholars was Liang Qichao, 
arguably the most influential of his generation. At the frontier of intellectual 
encounters in late Meiji Tokyo, Liang elevated the concept of jingshen to a new 
level of abstractness.    
Liang Qichao first equated jingshen to yuanqi, the primordial qi in its perfect 
form:  
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“Here is a big thing: it can be captured neither by ears nor by eyes; it can neither 
be borrowed nor appropriated; when it blooms and grows, it can embrace the 
Earth; when it suffers repression and destruction, it can dwindle at once and 
disappear without a trace. As a thing, it advances and retreats; expands and 
withers; falls to disgrace and regains its glory. Is its change due to Heaven or 
men? Despite its changeability, a man gains life when possessing it and dies 
when losing it. A nation survives when possessing it and falls when losing it. 
Furthermore, when a man or a nation is in possession of it, they can recover 
their life even at their deathbeds. But when they lose it, they are dead even when 
physically alive and die a true death without only their names lingering on. For 
this thing I have no name. I call it yuanqi.”88 
Liang goes on to relate jingshen to yuanqi:   
“What is jingshen? Jingshen is just the yuanqi of a nation. Things like clothing, 
food, instrument, buildings to politics and laws are all visible and audible. They 
are thus material forms (xingzhi). Within these material forms, there is a 
difference between the virtual and the real. Although things like politics and 
laws are audible and visible, they are not touchable by hands and buyable by 
money and thus are more difficult to obtain. Therefore, clothing and instruments 
are material forms of material forms, whereas politics and laws are the spirit 
(jingshen) of material forms. As for the yuanqi of the Nation, it cannot be 
created instantly, nor can it be the product of a person or a family. It is not 
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subject to the powers of the government, nor is it teachable by the instruction of 
a religion...”89   
This first definition of jingshen is a continuation of the neo-Confucian discourse 
of qi, similar to Wang Fuzhi’s shen. But Liang’s yuanqi differs from Wang 
Fuzhi’s shen in an important way: whereas shen is a property of qi, jingshen is 
both a property and a form of qi with its own independent and separate existence 
(thus Liang’s neologism “jingshen of jingshen”). But jingshen as both a form 
and the essence of qi presents a contradiction. The contradiction is resolved in 
the second and more refined definition of jingshen that Liang Qichao presents 
in My View of Life and Death in 1904. During the intervening years, Liang 
provided a jingshen that is conceptually distinctive from qi, under the influence 
of contemporary Japanese books, especially apologetics of Buddhism and other 
works that reconciled religion with science.90 
To illustrate this new spirit of jingshen, Liang presents a social-historical 
reading of karma and heredity by giving them a social and historical spin:  
“In the world, there are humans and beasts and other forms of life. Within the 
human realm, there are different families, nations and societies. Why are there  
so many different social forms? These (social forms) are all organized on mutual 
interactions and habituation of karmas. Therefore, our every single word, act 
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and thought today will be carved into the total karmas and becomes eternal. I 
myself and my race will have to receive its retributions in the future…”91  
This reinterpreted karma corresponds to a social-historical reading of heredity. 
 “According to the heredity of evolutionists, all living beings, as long as they 
are alive, pass their circumstances and the resulted habits to their descendants. 
Why are there so many different races and genera among the living beings and 
so many internal variations, differences and particularities within one race or 
genus? This is due to continuous struggle for survival from the beginning to 
date. In essence, different races and genera are created by the various 
circumstances and acts (of individual living-beings) during unlimited years. The 
so-called inheritance thus includes not only the formless character but also all 
the body-form with its singularities, all passed down and transformed (through 
evolution).”92           
By making a social-historical reading of karma and heredity, Liang defines 
concept of jingshen as the common attribute in these two concepts: 
“Buddhism advocates liberation in order to exit this world and enter nirvana, 
thus its doctrine is not to create karmas; the theory of evolution advocates 
struggle in order to enrich and dignify this world, thus its doctrine is to create 
karmas. What a polar opposite between the two views! However, both 
Buddhism and the theory of evolution indisputably agree that all men die but 
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leave behind something eternal. I want to name the (eternal) karma of Buddhism 
and the heredity of evolution jingshen….”93 
Liang’s purpose of reinventing the spirit has little to do with religion. The 
purpose was to justify and mobilize the sacrifice urgently needed to save China. 
He worked out for this purpose an elaborate correspondence between bigger self, 
smaller self, bigger other and smaller other. The bigger self and smaller self are 
the everlasting group and the individual self, whereas the bigger other and 
smaller other are the individual body and its constituent parts. A sacrificial 
sequence is established amongst the four: part of the body must be destroyed for 
the whole, the body may be forsaken for the spirit and the individual may be 
sacrificed for the group. 94 In a drastic reinterpretation of the standard for a 
Confucian sage-like prince (shengwang), Liang sets jingshen as the spiritual 
medium for individual moral sacrifice for the group: 
“Where is my spirit (jingshen)? Part of it is in the form of the many (the 
individual selves). This part will undergo unlimited circles of karmic 
transformations and incarnations and eventually eclipse into complete 
emptiness of nirvana. The other part of it is in the realm of the total (the bigger 
self), such as the group, the nation and the world. This is where my heredity and 
karma enters an unlimited process. If these two can be exchanged, I do not fear 
to see my small-self destroyed. To be sure, when both the body and the spirit 
can survive, there is no need to destroy the body. If they are not sacrificed, both 
the spirit and the body may be cultivated but their relative importance must be 
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clearly distinguished. When the body and the spirit cannot both survive, let 
perish the perishable and never perish the imperishable. To perish the 
imperishable is called the death of the heart. The nobleman says: “no sorrow is 
greater than death of the heart.”95 
This moral significance of jingshen easily finds echoes in Liang’s contemporary 
historical and polemical works. In these works, jingshen is no longer related 
with ancient concept of qi but variously identified with abstract concepts and 
values like harmony, unity, virtue, patriotism and even cosmopolitanism, which 
he associates with the Chinese national character.96 In other words, jingshen is 
the conceptual formulation of a historically constituted subject. Due to its 
abstract nature, jingshen becomes a spirit with its own existence and functional 
rules independent of matter or material world. Therefore, it is also conceptually 
distinctive from the shamanistic ling, which works with and through matter. In 
this sense, the new concept signals a new stage in the transformation begun 
millennia ago when the Chinese spirit first moved away from the dominion of 
late-Shang shamans.  
At this point of time, jingshen has not yet been associated with a future vision. 
It was associated with the abstractness of Chinese historical culture in the name 
of guocui or national essence. In the face of challenges from western ideas of 
civilization and social evolution, a group of scholars devoted themselves to the 
task of formulating a comparable spirit for the Chinese civilization. In their 
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search for such a spirit, they devised an approach drastically different from Qing 
method of critical textual study. Instead of establishing textual traditions 
through careful contextual philological study, these young scholars attempted 
to construct a theoretical tradition by sieving out common ideas from texts and 
identifying their literal similarities with dominant Western ideas, often without 
reference to the context. With a wide non-specialist audience and a political 
agenda in the mind, these scholars employed an approach very close in spirit 
with emergent popular styles found in newspapers, magazines and text books.  
Liu Shipei’s discovery of the Chinese tradition of social contract was a case in 
point. Inspired by Rousseau’s social contract, Liu and his coauthor Lin Xie 
determined to find the Chinese roots of people’s rights. The criterion for root-
finding appeared simple: any ideas and arguments similar to the idea of 
Rousseau could establish a lineage to the Chinese roots. In a relatively short 
time, they worked through Chinese classics and found plentiful quotes that 
satisfied such criterion, from The Book of Change to the evidentiary scholars of 
mid-Qing era. Even legalist texts like The Book of Lord Shang, Taoist texts like 
Lao-tzu and classical glossaries like Erya were found to foreshadow the idea of 
popular sovereignty and social contract.97 By taking words from their contexts 
and amassing a considerable corpus of texts, they were able to construct a 
Chinese parallel to the essence or jingshen of Rousseau’s ideas.    
The first systemic conceptualization of the Chinese spirit came from the 
Chinese-Eurasian Gu Hongming. Born to a Chinese merchant and his Eurasian 
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wife, Gu was raised in Penang and received education from European 
gymnasium and universities. A Qing loyalist conversant in Western culture, Gu 
was in an ideal position to offer an apology for Chinese culture. His second book, 
The Spirit of the Chinese People, became the first major exposition of Chinese 
civilization from the cultural conservatives. Gu’s was an unequivocal defense 
of Chinese cultural tradition and the spirit of the Chinese people, which he 
defined as “broad, deep, simple and delicate” with “a natural tendency for 
gentleness and civility”.98 These essential traits he associated with civilizing 
power of Confucianism, a social or state religion of China. But for the Chinese 
rendering of spirit, he insisted to apply the rather archaic Confucian term 
Chunqiu Dayi, or essence of The Spring and Autumn Annals, instead of jingshen 
of the Chinese People. The methodology of his book was similar to Liu Shipei’s 
search for Chinese spirit of popular sovereignty: the Chinese character, like all 
other national characters, was treated as a collection of enduring ideas and 
images to be found in the body of ancient texts and journalistic anecdotes. 
The new spirit invented and used by Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth-
century is a bounded and collective concept. Unlike universalistic spirit of ling 
and qi, which knows no boundary between the material world and historical 
subjects, jingshen is detached from the material world and associated 
exclusively with a historical subject, especially the Chinese nation. As such, it 
presents a different way for an individual to engage with the universe and the 
others. In the old spiritual world of ling and qi, spiritual cultivation and sacrifice 
are two common ways that an individual communicates with transcendence, 
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which need not encompass the whole individual life. In the world of jingshen, 
however, spiritual cultivation and sacrifice become a mode of life: it starts with 
identifying oneself with a collective goal, proceeds with preparing oneself for 
that goal and ends with devoting oneself to the collective goal.   
This new notion of the spirit marks the major break with the Confucius spiritual 
tradition. While neo-Confucians also urged dedication to collective goals such 
as service to the imperial order and local community, they are usually not moral 
imperatives or foundations, since the private ethical domains of the family were 
considered as ontologically but also morally prior to larger collectives. Indeed, 
only scholars of merits who have. Moreover, whereas the collective goals were 
universalistic and transcended communities for Confucians, they became 
inseparably bounded with the historically constructed notion of the nation for 
the practitioners of jingshen.      Indeed, the Confucian visions of virtue would 
still dominate the moral imaginations of most Chinese for decades. The 
collective turn symbolized by the invention of jingshen was only in potential 
form in the first two decades of the century as the definition of Jingshen itself 
remained  far from settled. In scholarly works, the word can still relate directly 
to its millennium old affiliation to qi. In fact, an intellectual as avant-garde as 
Cai Yuanpei would still take jingshen as a type of qi in a textbook on moral 
cultivation he published in 1911.99  
But in the 1920s, jingshen underwent a drastic politicization and popularization, 
as Sun Yat-sen and other political figures employed it for his revolutionary 
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enterprise. Sun first used jingshen in a speech to revolutionary soldiers in 1922. 
Sun first contrasts spirit with matter:  
“All phenomena in the universe are either spiritual or material. Although spirit 
is the opposite of matter, it works with matter to produce effect…… human 
organs and bones are bodily and thus material, but human words and actions are 
for use and thus spiritual….if one suddenly loses spirit, although there are 
organs and bones, one will not speak and act; as the use (of human body) is lost, 
the body becomes dead body. From this perspective, those with physical body 
but no use of spirit are non-human.” “With the use of spirit, humans are not 
entirely dependent on physical bodies. As a human-being, I shall gear up my 
spirit for action…thus revolution as action is dependent on spirit. The 
revolutionary enterprise originates from revolutionary spirit.”100 
For Sun, jingshen as a spiritual power was superior to material forces. He 
reckons that ninety-percent of the power of the revolutionary army came from 
its spirit, since a few battalions of soldiers could triumph over the powerful Qing 
garrison in one night during the Wuchang Uprising of 1911.101 He used the case 
of a buffalo boy and a buffalo to reinforce the point: despite his small size, the 
buffalo boy can direct the buffalo in any directions he wants. The reason is that 
while the boy possesses jingshen, the buffalo has none.102 Thus in Sun’s implicit 
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definition, jingshen is not simply about any power of the mind, but a self-
conscious human mind centered on a will to make history.  
Sun goes on in the speech to identify the exact meanings of revolution spirit for 
modern soldiers. It turns out to be very nearly Confucian. “What is the 
revolutionary spirit for soldiers? The three principal elements are intelligence 
(智), benevolence (仁) and courage (勇).”103 Benevolence has four “knows”: 
right and wrong, benefit and harm, historical trend, and ally and enemy. All the 
four “knows” are structured around the people and the nation. Benevolence for 
soldiers is defined the awareness of the objective for their sacrifice, namely the 
salvation of the nation. In Sun’s formulation, courage should be equated with 
the readiness and willingness to choose death over life for a worthy goal, which 
translated to his vision of national salvation. 104    
Sun never had the time to refine his jingshen into a coherent concept. But even 
if he were to do so, there would be nothing innovative about his argument on 
the power of the mind for soldiers, which had been discussed extensively by 
ancient strategists.105 His real innovation was the association of the neologism 
of jingshen with psychic powers of self-consciousness and self-determination. 
The result is a psychologization of spirit, parallel to Liang’s conceptualization. 
While jingshen as national essence is not the same as the will to sacrifice, they 
belong to the same cluster of interior spirit with the mind as the new crucible 
and history as the new sacred. The two jingshen defined psychologically and 
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historically are thus two sides of the same coin: the former is individual 




Jingshen and Interiorization of Spirit in Early Republican China  
 
In a changing spiritual world heralded by jingshen, there are bound to be vertical 
conflicts and accommodations. But while conflicts were inevitable, 
accommodations were in fact a far more salient feature of early Republican 
spirituality. Conflicts were mainly caused by the urge of jingshen for 
interiorization, whereas accommodation reflected interiorization in the realms 
of ling and qi. In the realm of ling, accommodations were best exemplified by 
new ideas and practices in redemptive societies; in the realm of qi, they were 
eminently observable in the theorization and spiritualization of various 
cosmological practices such as numerology and martial arts.  
In its form as a concept and an idea, jingshen was in fact detached from the 
worldly traditional spirit and unlikely to cause sectarian conflicts with older 
spirit. For example, nationalist leaders like Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek 
seemed to have no problem with the free use of jingshen and Holy Spirit of their 
Christian faith. But still, potential for conflicts arose when the interests of the 
modern state employed the new spirit as a means of centralizing control. As 
Prasenjit Duara argues, the first phase of the state campaign against popular 
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religion was in fact launched by the culturally conservative Yuan Shikai 
administration for the sake of his commitment to secular and modernizing goals, 
which resulted in economic conflicts with local religious establishment.106 But 
when the conflict developed to the second stage in the 1920s, ideological forces 
loomed large. As interests and ideology came together, conflicts between the 
new jingshen spirituality and myriad spirits of ling and qi came to a head in late 
1920s.    
In 1928 and 1929, radical intellectuals from the left wing of Nationalist Party 
launched a propaganda campaign against religions and superstitions. They 
declared from the dominant evolutionary view of history that religion and 
superstitions were relics of an older historical stage of development fiercely 
opposing progress. There were two major platforms for attack: psychological 
and historical.  
According to Huang Shaodan, religion and superstition run counter to two 
streams of human evolution: the evolution of human mind from obscurantism 
to scientific enlightenment and the evolution of human society from subjection 
to self-government or democracy. In either way, religions and superstitions were 
hurdles to be overcome. Jingshen was evoked in both arguments: first, it served 
as the basis for a new form of spiritual life (jingshen shenghuo) centered on self-
consciousness and rational thinking, which by definition was independent from 
and aversive to any external resources like deities or supernatural spirit; second, 
the desirable spirit of independence and self-government, which provided the 
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psychological basis for the modern democratic state, were incompatible with 
traditional religion, which was usually allied with traditional political regimes. 
107    
When most authors under the banner of reform attacked the spirit of religion 
and superstitions based on jingshen, a writer known by the penname Fang Cao 
demonstrated the defensive use of jingshen. Speaking against the radical view 
that all religions be abolished, Fang Cao bases his defense strictly on Sun Yat-
sen’s writings. Echoing Sun Yat-sen’s view on the need to develop the national 
spirit (minzu jingshen) for struggle and survival, he finds that such elements are 
in already existent in historical Buddhism, which did champion a spirit of stoic 
struggle and self-reliance in its earlier days. Moreover, the state-led attack on 
Buddhism and other religions violates the freedom of faith and thus the modern 
spirit of law (fazhi jingshen) that China badly needs to construct a modern 
society and government. Indeed, the enemy of the Party ideology should be 
theological power, rather than religion itself.108  
As Fang Cao shows somewhat paradoxically, the modern spirituality of 
jingshen can be accommodated with old spiritual traditions of qi, since one can 
still abide by the jingshen or ethical teaching of any traditional religion without 
believing in the mysterious and miraculous. The power of jingshen as an interior 
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spirit comes not from itself, but the hegemonic science of evolution, dominant 
ideology of nationalism, and most importantly, the ascendant power of the 
modern state. These powerful factors compelled all traditional spiritual 
traditions to undergo self-transformation.  
This interiorization of spirit was also observable across the domains of ling and 
qi. In the case of the old shamanistic practices, the trend was most evident in the 
emergent redemptive societies. From 1910s onwards, a large number of such 
redemptive societies came to the fore and effervesced into a spiritual movement, 
culminating with the wide spread of Yiguandao (一贯道) in 1930s. One earlier 
example of redemptive societies was the Jiushijiao (The World Saving 
Religion), which founded the monthly journal lingxue yuekan (Spirituality 
Monthly). While the new religion still recognized a variety of shamanistic 
practices, including spirit writing, its emphasis was now on everyday moral 
practices based on a more interior interpretation of spirit. As a contributor to 
lingxue yuekan argues:  
“One living in this world is constantly crisscrossing the ways of gods and devils. 
Once the mind entertains the good in accordance with li （理）, one becomes 
god. Once the mind reflects the evil contrary to li, one becomes devil. Therefore, 
when man deals with things and others during a day, the mind holds the key to 
good and evil. When one’s spirit is involved in a fight, the mind instantaneously 
fluctuates between god and devil. Only when one sees and believes deeply in 
the Way that one finds li in everything one does and sees god everywhere one 
goes. Thus there is nothing but clarity when one manages affairs and nothing 
but godliness when one manages the mind. This clarity and godliness is said to 
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be in accordance with the Heavenly Principles. Following this way, man is god, 
god is man. There is neither so-called god nor so-called man. If the opposite 
way is followed, man becomes slave to the devil. Viewed in this light, how 
could one not lead his life conscientiously? Moreover, how could one not be 
conscientious in cultivation of the Way?” 109  
Although god (shen) and ghost (gui), which used to be the manifestation of 
shamanistic spirits were still recognized as pervasive in world, they were made 
identical to moral status of a person, or more exactly, the moral consciousness 
of mind. Spiritual medium was no long central to the practice of this type of ling. 
To be sure, not all redemptive societies shared this view, but this view was quite 
consistent with the important of such syncretic ling-spirituality, such as the 
Yiguandao. The process of interiorization was exactly like what happened to 
Confucians a thousand years ago: the essential element was no longer 
connection with the supernatural but the knowledge and will for moral action. 
110 
The same line of development was most salient among the old cosmological 
practices of geomancy, astrology, numerology, martial arts and Chinese 
medicine in early decades of the twentieth century. Reform-minded 
practitioners of these arts worked hard to make cosmic qi compatible with 
modern science. For the most part, this meant inventing a standard theory of 
their old trades, establishing an epistemic lineage and integrating the theory and 
practice of qi with the national spirit of jingshen. Among the most significant of 
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these efforts was the development of Taoist inner alchemy centered on Taoist 
priest Chen Yingning, who exerted utmost efforts to bring scientific ideas into 
the Taoist cosmology and practice to remake it into a powerful tactic of bodily 
cultivation.111   
Meanwhile, a generation of theoretical cosmologists came of age in the 1910s 
and 1920s. Among the most prominent theoretical cosmologists was Yuan 
Shushan. Born to a family of traditional medical practitioners in 1881, Yuan 
attended Peking University and Tokyo University. But when he came back, he 
declined job offers in the officialdom and devoted his life to Chinese medicine, 
astrology and local education. Amongst the various trades of traditional 
cosmology, Yuan was most well-versed in numerology. In the introduction to 
his Historical Investigations of The Theory of Numerology, he advances two 
tenets in defense of this beleaguered trade: first, the ancient “science” still has a 
role in evolutionary struggles; second, the ancient knowledge of numerology 
could be reinterpreted in a modern light. Yuan recognized the overall validity 
of evolution, but referred to a gap between the general law of evolution and the 
particular fate for individuals, since general rule would not provide sufficient 
information on individual’s fate. 112 As such, he argues for a new numerology 
to fill the gap:  
“Of the ancient books of numerology, there are those with arguments but no 
case studies, those with cases but no arguments, those too wild and complex to 
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be precise and those too simplistic and laconic to be meaningful. Not only the 
starters feel it difficult to begin with, even the veterans fail to understand its 
nuances. My work tries to follow a gradual approach with clear classifications, 
gathering the strengths of various schools and shunning the weaknesses. In case 
the ancient works are unclear in their theory and inadequate in their cases, I risk 
presumptuousness by supplementing them with my own biased views…”113 
Despite his modesty, Yuan’s theoretical reformulation marked a major 
development in Chinese numerology: he introduced an element of scientific 
approach by making it an empirically well-founded and theoretically coherent 
body of knowledge. His book was instant success: it sold ten thousand copies in 
first edition and has been reprinted many times until nowadays.114  
Yuan’s reform of numerology demonstrated the ways by which the old 
cosmology survived and even thrived in early Republican China and beyond. 
First, traditional cosmic practices like numerology filled the gap between the 
popular understanding of scientific laws and everyday needs of the people who 
continue to believe in cosmological divinations. Moreover, during a time of 
uncertainty, the demand for divination tends to strong. Second, like organized 
religion, these cosmological practices underwent a theorization and became a 
form of practical knowledge readily available to all interested readers who could 
internalize them through reading and learning. This reformulation of 
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numerology in accordance with scientific laws was a general trend shared by 
leading numerologists of the time.115 
If the survival of numerology was a tale of timely rescue, the rise of Chinese 
martial arts was a story of resounding triumph. In the 1920s and 30s, martial 
arts ascended in popularity and prestige almost in tandem with jingshen. 
Theoretically, it was supported by a wealth of theoretical books. Wan 
Laisheng’s voluminous compendium offered a description of various elements 
of martial art, but also a summary account of all its related fields from traditional 
weapons to meditative technique. 116  More significant than the theoretical 
contribution was the marriage between martial art and the nationalistic spirit 
that was evident in A Sketch of the Theory of the Nation Skill by Wu Zhiqing, a 
general of the Nationalist army. His exposition on the cultivation of body and 
mind revealed the critical role of martial art training in the vocabulary of 
sacrifice: 
“If one wants to cultivate the perfect spirit (jingshen), one must first have a 
perfect body. For a feeble sick man feels frightened at any time but a strong and 
powerful sportsman certainly could keep a calm and peaceful mind in the face 
of sudden dangers and unsuspected affronts. Without fear, he can accomplish 
many things that others dare not to do. If we examine our people, we find that 
the majority are fearful of death and danger. This is a symptom of national 
perdition and an expression of national backwardness! All believers in 
                                                          
115 Chen Junzhi, “Qingmo minchu Zhongguo minglijie dui xihua de paichi he jiena”. 
Ehu Yuekan. Dec. 2013, p.15-18. 
116 Wang Laisheng, Wushu huizong (Compendium of Martial Arts). Shanghai: 
Commerce Books. 1929, pp.1-10. 
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sanminzhuyi and our great nationals: I hope to use martial art to promote in you 
a spirit of fearlessness (dawuwei jingshen)!”117    
Modern mass media also enabled transmigration of martial arts into a cultural 
product for the modern Chinese spirit. The best examples in Republican China 
were modern swordsman novels (wuxia xiaoshuo) based on legendary as well 
as contemporary masters of martial art. One of the most acclaimed works in this 
genre was Xiang Kairan’s Biographies of Modern Heroes and Swordsman 
serialized in 1923. In his effort to present masters of Chinese martial art, Xiang 
portrayed several famous contemporary masters of the art, in particular, Wang 
Zhengyi (nicknamed the Broadsword Wang Wu, d.1901) and Huo Yuanjia (d. 
1909).  
Xiang set his hero in a time of extreme national crisis in the Boxer Rebellion, 
when sectarian violence of the Boxers was virulent against defenseless Chinese 
Christians, who were regarded as devil-possessed. When a Boxer called upon 
him to visit his master and the Qing Prince of Duan, a royal protégé of the 
Boxers, Huo not only refused outright this invitation but also defended the 
innocent Christians on humanitarian ground.118  
An intertwined storyline is Huo Yuanjia’s victorious duels with foreigner 
fighters. Seeing that China was in need of well-trained bodies, Huo established 
a martial art academy to train the young and arranged contests with half a dozen 
famous foreign fighters to spread the name of his school as a proof against the 
                                                          
117 Wu Zhiping, Guoshu lilun gaiyao (A Sketch of the Theory of National Tactic). 
Shanghai: Dadong shuju. 1935, pp.28-29.  
118 Xiang Kairan (Buxiaosheng), Jindai xiayi yingxiongzhun (Biography of Modern 
Heroes and Swordsman). Taipei: Linking Books. 1984 (1929), p.172. 
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characterization of the Chinese as “The Sick Man of Asia”.119  Among the 
vanquished were a Russian wrestler, a British boxer and a Japanese samurai. By 
presenting the legendary master of martial arts in such a tragic light, the novelist 
distinguished the martial spirit from its qi practice and firmly embedded the 
martial arts in a nationalist spirit. The enduring popularity of Huo’s image as 
the emblem of Chinese nationalism in modern Chinese popular culture across 
the Sino-sphere is a testimony to the success of such an approach.  
In sum, the introduction of jingshen into the spiritual world seems to have 
brought about an interiorization of both shamanistic and cosmological practices, 
with the latter being more successful and widespread. For these old spirits, 
interiorization could take a variety of ways, such as psychologization, 
theorization, politicization and most successfully, media representation.   As 
jingshen gained supremacy in the official discourse, ling and qi in their 
transmigrated forms remained very much alive as spiritual vehicles in everyday 
life in early Republican China.   
 
Conclusion: The Disengaged Modern Spirit of Jingshen  
 
As jingshen became the new hegemonic spirit, Chinese spirituality entered a 
new phase of radical interiorization. It is hard to conclude for now whether we 
are through this transformation, since it is still difficult to decide between a 
refurbished Buddhism and a Chinese version of modern science as the 
                                                          
119 Ibid. p.93. 
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conceptual bedrock for jingshen. Further, given the relative recent existence of 
jingshen, it is still too early to place it on the same levels as qi and ling in the 
long dureé. But in a broader comparative framework, the development of 
jingshen from qi as a more abstract and psychic form of spirit parallels the 
development of the modern spirit in other parts of the world, best exemplified 
by the concept of Geist formulated by Friedrich Hegel.  
The Hegelian Geist of world history and the karmic jingshen are both dynamic 
spirit of historical movement. The former has deep roots in Christian 
eschatology; the latter, Mahayana Buddhism and neo-Confucian cosmology. 
Unlike the universalistic self-conscious and self-realizing Hegelian Geist, the 
karmic and psychic jingshen contains no implicit goals, no universalistic claims 
and no worldly revelations. Far from unified as inner logic and external 
manifestation of a single spirit, the karmic jingshen and the psychic jingshen 
tend to diverge over time. This divergence is demonstrated by fate of the modern 
spirit of Chinese people so central to early twentieth-century nationalism, which 
now boil down to a few desirable moral traits by no means shared by all Chinese 
or exclusive to the Chinese.120 For this innate weakness, the karmic jingshen 
necessarily attaches itself to actual historical heroes such as political leaders and 
ideological visions of history such as saminzhuyi. It was the only way that 
jingshen could become the building block of nationalist narrative and the state 
ideology.     
                                                          
120 Over a century, Gu Hongming’s characterization of Chinese spirit as broad, delicate, 
deep has devolved to the Communist characterization of Chinese people as industrious 
and courageous. But none of these have anything to do with the real life, since the so-
called authentic Chinese is a chimerical creature only available in symbolic forms.  
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But the intellectual and political function of jingshen is not restricted to 
construction of political ideologies. As a modern spirit, the form of jingshen is 
as important as its substance: its interior form suggests a method to translate 
experience of everyday life into abstract theories and cultural representations. 
As such, jingshen as a method allows the state to assess, classify and civilize 
worldly spirit according to criteria of abstractness and coherence. The result is 
a state-centered hierarchy of sanctioned spirit with zhuyi or orthodox ideology 
at the top, followed by science and arts, national and world cultural essence and 
the organized religions. At the bottom are those traditions with no extractable 
jingshen to form part of the national “spiritual civilization”. These spiritual 
leftovers are classified as cult (xiejiao) or superstition (mixin). The state 
campaign against popular religion in the late 1920s was only the beginning of 
the process of control and suppression, which would culminate in the spiritual 
campaigns of the Cultural Revolution.  
Despites all its power and promise, jingshen has an inherent weakness. Without 
any inherent cosmic and religious elements, this modern Chinese spirit is 
alienated from the country’s millennia-old spiritual traditions. As such, when it 
was invented and applied, this new spirituality could scarcely appeal to the 
common people, as few understood and still less sincerely believed in its 
underlying historical logic. This was case with the spirit of the Sun Yat-sen 
discussed in the introduction and the first chapter of the thesis: when people 
were convinced that the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum emanated no harmful spirit 
and disobeyed all the principle of qi flows, its intended symbolism likewise 
escaped their imagination, since a mausoleum without ling was not even a tomb 
but only a harmless tourist resort.  
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The effectiveness of jingshen either as historical force or psychological weapon 
requires a minimum understanding about a future vision and abstract symbols. 
Such vision and symbols simply escaped most ordinary Chinese, who still saw 
the world through more shisu (secular) and spiritual (ling) lens than the elites. 
121 For the common folk, the most acceptable symbolic representation of 
jingshen is perhaps somebody like Huo Yuanjia and his martial arts and the 
reformed art of numerology. Thus, measured by its influence, qi must be 
considered in the same rank as jingshen as the key components in the spiritual 
world of early Republican China.  




                                                          
121 Recall that I discuss in the beginning of this chapter that the world Shisu (secular) in modern 




Cultivation and Sacrifice: 
New Modes of Elite Self-Formation, 1895-1937 
 
The first two chapters have examined two facets in the transformation of 
sacrifice: rulership rituals and the idea of spirit. This chapter shall turn to the 
last major theme of the thesis, namely, changes in elite self-formation. I shall 
trace the development of a new paradigm, self-sacrifice, as it emerged from a 
chiefly feminine virtue in late imperial China to become the requisite virtue of 
every self-conscious Chinese citizen on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War in the 
mid-1930s as it became identified with the central quality of a virtuous person, 
especially a model student, a good Republican citizen or a qualified party 
member.  
Before the rise of the modern concept of sacrifice among cosmopolitan Chinese 
in early twentieth century, self-cultivation (修身  Xiushen) has been the 
dominant mode of self-formation for the Chinese elites. Broadly defined, self-
cultivation is the process by which a person gradually improves oneself 
physically, intellectually and most importantly, morally, in accordance with 
certain prescribed doctrines and geared towards certain goals. In late imperial 
China, self-cultivation is mostly based on Confucian doctrines and geared 
towards the worldly moral ideal of sagehood.122 
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In social practice, self-cultivation was closely connected with the acquisition of 
cultural capital and success in the Civil Service Examinations for Chinese males. 
This was of critical importance to anyone who wanted to move from the 
cultivation from a basic and mandatory level as an individual and head of 
household to a higher level of the governance of state and pacification of the 
universal all-under-heaven (修齊治平 Xiuqizhiping). This mode of elite self-
formation is linked to transformations in the life world of Chinese elite from the 
mid-tenth to the early twentieth century.123  Even though dynastic wars and 
social disorders often challenged such a model, the old social order was always 
able to reinstall itself until it was permanently transformed in the early twentieth 
century.  
 
This kind of self-formation was based on a particular understanding of elite 
selfhood. First, it is clearly gendered, as cultivation is only the ultimate end for 
literati men. Female cultivation is not forbidden and even encouraged, but only 
as preparation for a subordinate role. Second, it is conditioned on a literati rather 
than military life. Military virtues such as sacrifice for the nation, physical 
power and rigid discipline became less important for late imperial idea of elite 
Chinese manhood since the Song Dynasty. 124  Third, it is premised upon a 
communal form of life, in accordance with the Confucian social ideal of tilling 
and studying (耕讀, Gengdu). The social role for the self-cultivating scholar 
                                                          
123 The upper bound of the period refer to the founding of Song imperial order, as the 
early Song rulers carried out the institutionalization of the Civil Examination System 
and the de-militarization of the society, especially the elite.  
124 Bret Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese History, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013, pp.91-92.  
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was thus reproduced through the Civil Service Examinations. 125 Last but not 
least, it is closely linked to universalistic ideals of the transcendent Way, rather 
than national, ethnical and local identities. 126  
This last feature is particularly important for understanding sacrifice for modern 
Chinese. In late imperial China, although some latent forms of nationalism 
already tied the groups as widely as the Manchu, overseas Chinese, Confucian 
elites and Muslim Chinese to various collective identities and the Qing Empire, 
a single unified concept of the Chinese has not yet emerged. 127 Individuals were 
primarily identified with the extended family and lineage clan and local 
community.  
But in twentieth-century Chinese identity formation, priorities were given to the 
bounded collective of the nation, which often came with the image of a 
sacrificial mother. Just at a time when the sacrifice or victimization of women 
in the ancient regime was increasingly recognized and deplored in the New 
Culture Movement, the mother as the paragon of sacrifice was projected to the 
nation, which alone had the moral authority to demand the sacrifice of her 
                                                          
125 Elman Benjamin, “Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service 
Examinations in Late  Imperial China,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.50, No.1, (Feb 
1991), pp.27-28.  
126 Yuri Pines, The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and 
Its Imperial Legacy, NJ: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, pp.79-81. 
127 Moral cultivation became a cultural currency in the empire of late imperial China. 
See Yu Yingshih, Zhongguo jindai zongjiao lunli yu shangye jingshen (Modern 
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Chinese Culture), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2003, pp.111-113. For the 
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wenhua (Multiculturalism in Hui Culture), Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe., 
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children in return. When this kind of sacrifice became the rule for elite selfhood, 
cultivation was increasingly subjected to sacrifice as preparation for sacrifice.  
The rise of nationalist sacrifice also had an impact on cultivation. In many ways, 
the changes were a reversal of the late imperial trend. First, cultivation was no 
longer only for males as females were also qualified to cultivate themselves for 
the nationalist cause. Second, military virtues of rigid self-discipline and bodily 
training began to supplant literati virtues as new criteria for a cultivated person, 
especially for the male. Lastly, the old lifestyle of the literati gave way to a new 
life pattern of modern students, whose qualities were no longer assessed by 
successes in examinations but measured by a broader set of criteria, including 
virtues of self-sacrifice.  
To understand these trends, we need to delve into the changing social context 
of elite self-formation in the early twentieth century. In the following discussion, 
I shall examine this transformation from self-cultivation to self-sacrifice 
through the lens of individual’s reflective writings about their lives and their 
relations with society, the nation and the Party. The ideal sites to examine such 
transformations are autobiographical writings of a new generation of 
intellectuals and guidebooks for self-formation in Republican China, which will 
constitute the source of my investigation.  
 
Sacrifice and Cultivation in Literati Self -formation  
 
In late imperial China, sacrifice and cultivation as ways of life were gendered. 
Under the prevailing mode of social reproduction of elites centred on the Civil 
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Service Examination system, the success of a family clan was critically 
dependent on the examination success of male members. The process would 
require large amount of sources and sustained sacrifice from other family 
members, not in the least the opportunity cost of male labour. Such sacrifice 
would not only be in the form of wealth accumulated over decades and even 
generations, but also daily sacrifice of the female members of the household, 
and most importantly, a supportive, thrifty and toiling mother and wife. In 
addition to everyday toil, late imperial Chinese women also had to make 
significant sacrifices in child-bearing and child-rearing and risked their life in 
child delivery.128   
But this is not to say that cultivation played little role in late imperial women’s 
life. Both Susan Mann and Dorothy Ko have argued that late imperial women 
also practiced self-cultivation in the spheres of arts, religious pilgrimage, 
community and domestic life in their definitive works on literati women in late 
imperial China. In particular, literati women often practiced and engaged in a 
variety of social activities centred on classic learning, poetry and other literary 
exchanges.129 But they also concede that the cultivation aspects of the feminine 
life was inscribed within, rather than developed independently of, the more 
dominant tradition of Three Following (sancong) within the household model. 
130Thus in late imperial China, women’s increasing commitment to cultivation 
                                                          
128  Yi-li Wu, Reproducing Women: Medicine, Metaphor, and Childbirth in Late 
Imperial China, CA: California, University of California Press., pp.30-31.  
129 Susan Mann, Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century, CA: Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1997.pp,117-124; Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chambers: 
Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China, CA: Stanford, Stanford University 
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was not necessarily contradictory with the sacrificial role of women that held 
them in subjection. Rather, the rise of self-cultivation among elite women might 
have instead enhanced self-cultivation as a universalistic mode of self-formation.     
Whereas the Confucian traditions championed virtuous women who devoted 
their life to the cultivation of their menfolk, a similar kind of sacrifice was also 
the standard for feminine identity at the margin of the Confucian establishment. 
This sacrificial role assigned to women was vividly demonstrated in popular 
fictions such as The Water Margins. In this kind of fictionalized reality, 
sexualized women were often sacrificed in the loyalty ritual for the formation 
of social bond between male rebels, while de-sexualized women were treated 
similarly as male fighters for their warrior virtues of sacrifice.131 This view of 
women can be compared with the sacrifice of virtuous Confucian women. In a 
late imperial cultural context, the sacrificial nature of the women’s social role 
was the same, whether they were virtuous widows or sexualized femmes fatales.  
While a more complex picture of women’s sacrifice in late imperial China is 
still forthcoming, there was in late imperial China a certain political and cultural 
order that compelled females rather than male into a sacrificial mode of self-
formation, although a similar self-cultivation was permissible as long as it 
served sacrificial ends. But interestingly, the sacrificial mode of female self-
formation did not feature prominently in literati high culture. It was rare for 
Chinese writers, mostly literati-scholars, to foreground the role of women, 
mother or wife, in their personal development in their published writings.  But 
still, there were important exceptions, such as commemorative essays which 
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provide a rare glimpse into a literati view of the feminine sacrifice. One such 
example was Gui Youguang’s depiction of his mother.  
“My late mother was Madame Zhou. She was born on the eleventh of the second 
month of the year 1488. She married into the Gui family at the age of sixteen. 
In the second year of her marriage she bore Shujing; Shujing is my elder sister. 
The following year she bore me, Youguang, and the year following that bore 
twins: one soon died, and the other did not survive into her second year. Two 
years later she bore Youshang, after a pregnancy of twelve months. In the 
second year thereafter she bore Shushun, and in another year she bore Yougong. 
Though she was in more robust health when suckling Yougong than with the 
other children, she frequently knit her brows and complained to her maids: 
‘Having so many children has worn me out.’ An older maid placed two snails 
in a cup of water and offered it to her, saying: ‘After drinking this, your 
pregnancies will be fewer.’ My mother drained the potions in one go, but she 
was so distressed she could not speak….”132 
Gui’s mother died at her twenty-fifth year. This was a tragically youthful death 
even in sixteenth-century, but the experience of bearing and rearing four to six 
children from her sixteenth to twenty-second years was by no means atypical of 
the women from literati families in late imperial China. This kind of life cycle 
clearly placed late imperial women in a sacrificial role. Gui’s writings clearly 
reflected his awareness of such sacrifice, albeit without mounting a critique like 
writers in the New Culture Movement. In the following passages, he recalled 
                                                          
132 Gui Youguang, My Mother: A Brief Life, in David Pollard, The Chinese Essay, New 
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fondly how his mother toiled to keep the household in order and took pains to 
secure his early education, just one year before she did of plague:   
“I started school at the age of seven along with my cousin Youjia. Whenever 
the wind was cold, or it was drizzling, my cousin stayed at home. I longed to 
stay at home too, but was not allowed to. When my mother woke a night, she 
would make me recite from the Classics of Filial Piety in the dark. If I got it by 
heart and did not stumble over a word, she was very pleased…”133  
Gui’s feelings for his mother might be shared by many literati men in his times, 
yet they did not leave us any vocabulary for such sacrificial love, the lack of 
which made his essay all the more poignant to a modern reader. But in Gui’s 
time, it was indeed quite impossible for literati to openly acknowledge and 
indeed praise such sacrifice without narrating it in a grand narrative of 
Confucian self-cultivation. Thus the stories for a good mother and loving wife, 
which featured frequently in late imperial drama and fictions, were invariably 
examination success and official status of their sons and husbands, who in turn 
returned them filial and conjugal piety as well as officially recognized social 
status. In other words, in a typical elite household, sacrifice was principally for 
cultivation and its best return was cultivation, which in turn made sacrifice 
worthwhile.  
Despite challenges from radical thinkers and heterodox culture in late imperial 
China, this model of sacrifice for cultivation remained dominant throughout late 
imperial times.134 At the core of its validity was the belief that self-cultivation 
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134 There were constant critiques of the gendered model of Confucian orthodoxy was 
concerned particularly with the ritualistic and gendered assumption of cultivation, 
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was the only true path for sagehood and perfect manhood, which needed to be 
coupled with a true femininity in a life of sacrifice. Such a social norm was 
actively encouraged by the state and the literati elite: the number of chastity 
memorials in local societies and entries of virtuous women in local gazetteers 
has increased continuously from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century. 
135 Meanwhile, the late imperial state also encouraged similar literati sacrifice 
such as extreme dedication to work and martyrdom for an imperial house or 
refusal to serve a new ruling dynasty. Both practices were in fact of a much 
smaller scale and far from the norm, even during the political chaos of Ming-
Qing transition.136  
In the nineteenth century, sacrifice began to play a larger role in elite self-
formation. The Taiping War, by far the most violent religious war in world 
history, alone claimed fourty million lives, including numerous Jiangnan elites 
and their families. The war and ensuing social disruptions also dealt a heavy 
blow to the cultivation model as it ravaged through China’s most culturally 
advanced region and impinged on the functioning of the Civil Service 
Examination. 137  The Qing state and literati elites, in their its military and 
political adjustments to counter the rebels, had to resort to parallel militarization, 
which necessarily demanded a militant sacrificial ethos. However, despite the 
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92 
 
scale of social upheaval, the tumultuous years of the mid-century dynastic crisis 
did not fundamentally reshape the dominant idea and practice of cultivation as 
the higher path to true sagehood.  
From the 1840s to the 1890s, the world order of the Qing was under ever more 
heavy fire from Western and Japanese Empires. But most literati elites did not 
wake up to the reality of the world until the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Still 
less was such response reflected in common practices of self-formation. Only 
in exceptional cases did literati elites orient to self-sacrifice. For example, Tan 
Sitong followed a Buddhist model of sacrifice and martyred himself in 1898. 
But while Tan’s heroic act was highly similar to later Nationalists and 
Communists martyrs, his sacrificial urge was in fact less than representative. As 
Chang Hao argues, Tan’s urge for sacrifice came mostly from his particular life 
experience: he lost his mother as a baby and then his only sister at the age of 
nine, and his relationship with his father was estranged at the best. Such 
childhood misfortunes played a critical role in cultivating a pessimistic view of 
life and a sacrificial tendency.138  
In the last year of the 1890s and early 1900s, the dominant idea for the 
Confucian elites old and new was still self-cultivation, with the possible 
exceptions of radical nationalists who were mostly based in Japan, overseas 
Chinese communities and a few metropolitan centres. 139  But with the 
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abolishment of the Civil Examination and the proliferation of modern schools 
in the early twentieth century, changes in self-formation became more 
pronounced, in particular for modern students. Eventually, the new mode of 
selfhood would become more prevalent as the students became the new social 
elites and the Nationalist state increasingly played a dominant role in the 
Chinese society and education.   
 
From Cultivation to Sacrifice: Social Change and the Life of 
Modern Students 
 
While political changes certainly played a role in the rise of sacrificial ethos 
among modern Chinese elite, social forces produced by modernization and 
globalization were equally important drivers and catalysts. For modern students, 
the motivation for sacrifice was often yoked to alienation, estrangement or ennui 
about individual life, a profound sense of powerlessness and uncertainty, even 
before such sentiment was galvanized into action by nationalism.  
In late imperial China, when the examination system was still firmly in place, 
there existed at least in theory a pathway for talents from lower echelons of the 
society to move to the apex of cultural and political power. This was in a way 
achieved by a finely calibrated educational system. At the lowest reach, village 
schools provided for low-quality but affordable early education to the country’s 
tens of millions of boys whose family only had limited financial means. The 
village school tutors, often scholars who had only managed to pass the 
                                                          




preliminary round of examinations, usually asked no more than subsistence 
compensation. Usually conveniently located in the countryside and sometimes 
within the family clans, these grassroots institutions of education were part of 
the local cultural community as well as the subsistence economy. In retrospect, 
the system in fact guaranteed a certain basic level of education and cultural order 
in the rural society. 140 
As mentioned, this arrangement supported a particular way of life, known as 
tilling and studying for aspirants who had the means for basic education in late 
imperial China. Under this system, boys could achieve basic literacy while 
working part-time for the family, due to the vicinity of the school and the rather 
flexible schedules in the countryside. If he proved to be more talented and 
motivated and the family clans had a little more means, he could move to 
government school in the county and district seat or a private institution.  
More resourceful families could send their sons to study at better schools and 
even to the imperial academy for still better examinations, but the fact that it 
was passing examinations in classics rather than school attendance that 
determined the degree meant that other factors such as individual talent were as 
important as, if not more critical than financial means in determining the 
outcomes. The resourceful could enjoy a head start but not a predetermined 
success, whereas the less resourceful could still strive for success.  
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Moreover, since the examination was only a proxy for moral self-cultivation, 
even failed literati-official could always find ways to realize moral worth and 
even sagehood. Henrietta Harrison’s study of Liu Dapeng (1857-1942) was a 
case in point. The protagonist, a farmer-businessmen and local leader, tried 
many times but never passed higher levels of examinations. He nevertheless 
held fast to Confucian doctrine of moral uprightness in his daily life and carried 
out a rigid program of self-cultivation. 141 But while Liu could still enjoy such 
a life pattern, the grounds for traditional self-cultivation gradually shifted in the 
early twentieth century.  
A modern student finding his ways in the world of the 1910s and 1920s would 
feel very differently from young literati in the 1880s. For one thing, education 
became a form of investment which needed to be repaid by gainful jobs which 
were difficult to secure at home and even in the metropolitan areas.142 The basic 
reality of economic life dictated that typical modern educated elites of early 
twentieth-century China must become physical and spiritual migrant. They were 
not only physically displaced from hometown and family but also spiritually 
estranged from traditional spirituality and cultivation. The worst case scenario, 
intellectual migrants turned to intellectual vagabonds. As Du Yaquan observed 
as early as 1916, those intellectuals who failed to enter high class would turn 
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into “intellectual vagabond” (知識遊民), a radical social force and instigator of 
radical actions in the society. 143  
These environmental factors had an adverse impact on maintaining the old mode 
of self-cultivation. As discussed, while the sacrificial ethos was on the rise in 
the late 1890s, it had not dominated the scholar community. But towards the late 
1910s and 1920s, cultural currents seemed to have quickly caught up with 
political changes, as the chaotic politics of early Republican years dashed most 
if not all hopes of a stable and prosperous China among the young aspirants.  
Wu Mi, a graduate from Tsinghua who studied comparative literature at Harvard 
from 1917 to 1924, was a good example of anguished youth. Born to a literati 
family in Shaanxi, Wu moved to the United States in his mid-twenties after full 
classical education in his childhood and excellent groundings in Western 
learning at Tsinghua School. In the late 1910s and early 1920, Wu watched 
anxiously the unsettling political situations as well as the unfolding of the New 
Culture Movement in China while studying in Harvard. In the early months of 
1920, as the movement raged on in China, a dispirited Wu reflected in his diaries 
his emotional crisis: 
“Today I am extremely tired after reading all day long. In the evening I am in a 
dreadful mood. Think about those American students: they must have gone out 
and dated their girlfriends, danced together in the day, slept together in the night 
and freely enjoyed the flower of youth. How enviable! We Chinese students 
merely read away the days. The Americans, males and females had played 
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together even in their childhood; when they were elder, they had already known 
each other; they sought pleasure and slept together like married couples even 
before marriage. The Chinese students, sojourners in a foreign land, could not 
find such comfort. Alas, we had no taste of intimacy even when we were (as 
students) in China! A native of Shaanxi and Sichuan who travelled to Beijing 
and Shanghai for study was estranged from his wife and family. In the many 
years without a woman by side, even a glimpse of the feminine figure and a 
sound of feminine voice were impossible…” 144 
But instead of brooding on a barren life, Wu abruptly turned to the evils of the 
New Culture Movement:  
“After this, the last hope for China is dashed…. Those things advocated by the 
so-called New Culture Movement are virus in the eyes of the West. Whereas the 
upper class here tried all means to deter and prevent the virus, people in our 
country rushed to embrace it. How can there be any construction after this 
destruction? How is any plan for order possible after this disturbance? I only see 
the mass disheartened and inactive, falling with them (New Culture advocate) 
into moral depravation.”  
Worse still, Wu reckons that his personal situation was inevitably tied to this 
current of the time and China’s fate:  
“Think further about the path of my life, what to do with my life after my return 
to China? All anxieties and torments are already predictable by now. The 
proliferation of evil ideas like “liberation”, “independence”, and “freedom of 
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love” will inevitably lead to the destruction of ethical standards and the four 
principle values of ritual observance, righteousness, probity and shame. How 
can I seek for peaceful family life, harmonious filial relations and affectionate 
conjugal relation?  Alas, the future is as bleak as that, and today is as bitter and 
toiling like this, what is the joy of my life? I should frankly end my life and 
within a few minutes all the misery will fall into a state of amnesia. What enteral 
peace, what eternal joy!”  145  
Overcome by anxieties and desperation, Wu Mi attempted to kill himself by 
walking into a nearly river. But when he saw the lamp lights from the river bank, 
a couple emerging from the woods after a presumed romantic affair, frequent 
passing of cars and a constable with a hand light, he realized the death would 
only incur more shame for him and the nation and abandoned the attempt.146    
Wu’s juxtaposition of individual ennui and concern for the national are 
remarkable. In the past, he and his likes would probably seek asylum in the faith 
in the moral truth of the Confucian way. They could renounce this world and 
find a physical retreat in nature or in lower echelon of the society.147 For new 
generation of literati in the twentieth century, asylum was harder to find. The 
hope in the nation has replaced the way, but this hope proved to be a source of 
anxiety and desperation rather than comfort. When individual life lost anchor 
and hope, it was understandable that many young scholars would passively 
resort to the desperate act of suicide. And it was also conceivable that such 
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desperation would equally lead to sacrificial act for the nation. This sacrificial 
connection would become even more evident in revolutionary writings. In this 
case, sacrifice became a positive one linked with a future vision.   
While a student from such background as Wu Mi could at least afford overseas 
studies, poor students from peasant background would have to face a harsher 
reality of life in China, such as most of China’s revolutionaries who was born 
the 1890s and 1900s. For this group, radicalization was more pervasive as even 
opportunities for further studies and employment were out of question. Among 
these radicals, Fang Zhimin (1899-1935) was by no means a typical man for his 
extraordinary exploits, but the sacrificial ethos which motivated his radicalism 
was representative of his generation.  
Born to a peasant family, Fang was an unlikely candidate for traditional 
Confucian cultivation. He was fortunately enough to receive aid from a village 
tutor, a poor scholar who found him a talented boy and allowed him attend 
village school. Later, his family and friends mustered all means to afford him a 
primary education at Yiyang County. But while attending primary school, he 
was drawn to a campus-wide boycott of Japanese goods. He broke his entire 
collection of Japanese products and vowed never to buy Japanese medicine even 
at risk of life. 148 
Upon graduation, Fang moved to Nanchang to attend Nanchang Industrial 
School located in the provincial capital 200 km away from the county seat. 
There he had his first encounters with foreigners. While he recognized that 
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“there were Westerners who were learned, morally upright and sympathetic to 
China’s national emancipation”, he found others who came to China for money, 
enjoyment and especially the missionaries, exceedingly obnoxious. One day, 
upon witnessing a Japanese postal master bullying his Chinese underlings, he 
was quick to ask himself: why should the Chinese let a foreigner run the Postal 
Service?149  
After his dismissal from high school for political activism, Fang received 
financial aid to attend a missionary school at Jiujiang, a treaty port along the 
Yangtze-River.  In his recollection, the Jiujiang experience was painful on two 
accounts: the scene of foreign gunships and merchant fleets freely sailing along 
the Yangtze River, and the hugely unequal pay between Chinese and Western 
teachers at the missionary school was in violation of the school motto of 
“equality and fraternity”. 150  
After a two-year stint at Jiujiang, Fang again sailed downstream along the 
Yangtze to Shanghai, the ultimate metropolitan centre of modern China, in 
search of a party-time job and possible schooling. In addition to disappointment, 
he was humiliated by a signboard at an entrance to a French Park that read in 
Chinese “Chinese and dogs are not permitted”. 151   
But the most horrid experience of all was his encounters on a passenger 
steamship run by the Japanese on his way back from Shanghai. At the lowest 
deck where he stayed with the poorest of the poor, a team of six ticket collectors, 
armed with sticks and headed by a fat man in a suit and wearing a moustache 
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(presumably Japanese), came to bully ticketless Chinese and humiliated a 
peasant woman in public. In Fang’s recollection, the scene was a sharp affront 
to Chinese people that hit him especially hard. 152 
Here he abruptly stopped his recollection and urged his compatriots to sacrifice 
for the motherland: 
“Friends, I have encountered many similar things later, and indeed, things ever 
worse. It would take days for me to finish the bitter tales and I cannot bear to 
speak more. In sum, there is bitterness and grievance everywhere in this semi-
colonial China but nowhere to voice them out. But friends, every time when my 
heart is stung, my determination for China’s national liberation grows stronger. 
I always think in this way: ‘if the Chinese nation can be liberated, what is there 
to spare of my infinitesimal life!”153 
The logic of sacrifice is entangled with a geographical imagination of the 
motherland: 
 “Friends! China is the mother who gives birth to us Chinese. Do you find this 
mother lovely? I think you must have the same opinion as mine: she is indeed 
lovely! In terms of climate, as China is in the temperate zone, she is neither too 
hot nor too cold. This is like our mother’s body temperature, which is just ideal 
for the baby to lean on her lap. In terms of territory, China is a large country, 
thousands of minds in width and breadth. This is just like our mother, a broad-
shouldered woman, not as thin and slim as Japan. Are the great mountains and 
rivers, lakes large and small, symbols for the healthy wrinkles and folds in our 
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mother’s firm and plump skin? The productivity of the Chinese soil is unlimited; 
the treasures hidden and unexplored in the land are also unlimited; and the 
power of nature left unharnessed is still more unlimited. Are these not symbols 
of our mother, who has unlimited milk and power to feed her four hundred 
million children?”154 
He went on to liken the natural scenery in China to the endowed beauty of a 
mother and the current political and economic exploitations that China was 
suffering to poverty and humiliation suffered by a mother, who was like a 
beggar compared with the Japanese and European ladies.155 As if the symbolic 
humiliation was not enough, Fang supplied more gruesome details about the 
motherland’s suffering, as she was surrounded, abused, bled and flayed alive by 
cannibalistic “devils” or the imperialistic powers, certainly with a view to 
agitate his fellow countrymen to stand in defence of the motherland at all 
costs.156  
Needless to say, Fang Zhiming’s recollection needs to be taken with a grain of 
salt, not in the least because it was written when he was a high-ranking 
Communist leader in a Nationalist jail in 1935. But before he joined revolution 
and sacrificed his life, Fang the former intellectual vagabond shared many ideas 
with Wu Mi the intellectual migrant as they associated in an intimate way his 
daily experience with the idea of the nation as the sacred. While Wu Mi never 
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used the motherland metaphor in his diary, it was nevertheless the most 
favoured metaphor for his friend and Qinghua classmate, Wen Yiduo.157 
Another salient feature of Fang’s writing is the invocation of reciprocity as 
justification for sacrifice. The motherland in Fang Zhimin’s writing is a 
metaphor for the land and people that had nurtured Chinese who owed their life 
to the motherland. Just like a filial son or daughter must repay the sacrifice of 
the mother, they need to repay the nation. For the literati like Gui Youguang, 
this repayment was in the form of ritual obligation; but for the revolutionaries, 
the repayment was sacrifice. As we shall discuss later, this logics of reciprocity 
was also evident in Fang’s political enemies, the Nationalists, who demanded a 
similar sacrifice from the citizens.    
The early Republican period saw rapid transformation in the mode of self-
formation. In the 1910s, most popular guidebook on self-formation still 
preserved two options for self-formation: the reclusive and the active. In the 
1910s, the most popular ethics textbook, Cai Yuanpei’s textbook on the self-
cultivation of nationals still placed Confucian moral cultivation as the most 
important part of self-formation.158 Even in the 1920s, the famous lay Buddhist 
and qigong master Jiang Weiqiao (1872-1958) still recommended spiritual 
cultivation as more preferable if not superior ideal for youth eager to seek 
meanings in life.159 But this reclusive option declined and eventually became 
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impossible as the new Republican Government in Nanjing and later the 
Communists in Yan’an sought forcefully to implement their visions of sacrifice-
based citizenship.   
 
 
Cultivation for Sacrifice: Women and Students Self -formation in the 
Early 1930s 
 
In the mid-1920s, China’s political situation changed drastically. A new and 
unprecedented organizational force, the Party and its affiliated Party army, 
emerged on the political scene. In the 1920s, the Whampoa Military Academy 
began to churn out legions of self-disciplined youth ready to die for the 
Nationalist political cause. Chiang Kai-shek, the first President of the Academy, 
implemented a strict training scheme on the cadets that combined a highly 
demanding self-discipline, a sense of national mission and an urge for 
extraordinary sacrifice.160  
The Whampoa experiment and its later successes in the Northern Expedition 
gave its leader, later the Generalissimo of China, Chiang Kai-shek a head start 
in the political game to change China. It also testified to the superior sacrificial 
virtues of soldiers, which Chiang eagerly wanted to implement to the society. 
But the opportunity for implementation would only ripen in the early 1930s after 
they pacified or subordinated other major domestic political and military actors. 
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Once the condition was ready in 1934, Chiang decided to implement an 
essentially military program of national moral cultivation, the New Life 
Movement.  
The New Life Movement was envisioned as a social reform to upgrade the moral 
standard of average Chinese nationals and prepare them for national 
salvation. 161  According to Chiang Kai-shek, the central message of the 
movement was Confucian doctrines of ritual propriety, righteousness, probity 
and honour (禮義廉恥 ), whereas the basic approach is to apply military 
principles of order, cleanliness, plainness and simplicity. 162 But above all, the 
aim was to make nationalistic sacrifice the purpose for self-cultivation, as spelt 
out clearly in Chiang Kai-shek’s inaugural address: 
“What is the New Life Movement that I promote? Simply put, it is thorough 
militarization of all people’s life in China! To cultivate courage, speed, 
endurance and industry, especially the habit and instinct of military uniformity! 
To be able to sacrifice anytime for the nation! We don’t need nationals who 
cannot wash with cold water and eat cold meal! In order to cultivate citizens 
who can fight the enemies and sacrifice for the nation, we must militarize the 
life of all our people. And militarization is order, cleanliness, plainness and 
simplicity. Only with such qualities can we follow the principles of ritual 
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propriety, righteousness, probity and sense of shame, adapt to modern life and 
become worthy nationals of a modern nation!”163 
The Movement is specifically targeted to young students, who most likely 
would need to be mobilized as soldiers in the imminent war with Japan, but it 
also embraces a wide range of social groups, in particular, urban women, by 
providing moral guidance. The New Life for Women written by Fu Yan was just 
one of these guidebooks designed for urban women to seek new life.  
In order to establish the principle of a new life, the old life of Chinese women 
must be refuted. To this end, Fan argues in the very first pages that traditional 
Chinese society systematically suppressed women and deprived their rights:  
“While the life of both men and women has been both bounded by 
Confucianism (禮教,lijiao), there was a large difference in terms of the degrees. 
Men are the beneficiary and women the victim across all domains. From the 
perspective of the old religion, men have independent personhood while women 
are deprived of it. Men are the subject while women are the subordinate, such 
as the Principes of Three Followings.”164 
She recommends four programs for women to strive for a new life. The first 
program is bodily cultivation, such as taking care of one’s own health, attention 
to personal hygiene, caring for children’s body growth, elimination of bad habits, 
and promotion of physical exercise.165 The second program concerns diligent 
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housework, which ranges from regularly washing cloth and shopping to 
treatment of guests.166 The third program focuses on intellectual and moral 
cultivation of the children. Last but not least, there is a fourth program which 
focuses on the spirit of social service. While she is aware that “women are 
currently not powerful enough to pursue professional life”, she also urges that 
“we must first cultivate a spirit for social service at the first so that we can 
provide service to society within our power whenever and wherever it is 
needed.”167        
But such programs for cultivating new women could not materialize without an 
action plan. In order to put the programs into action, Fu urges Chinese women 
to adopt a rigid program of self-discipline. Apart from the stress on details, 
regularity and scientific spirit, she particularly highlights two military virtues: 
simplicity and speed in the implementation of programs of cultivation. The 
principle of simplicity refers not only to simple and unadorned material life but 
also an orderliness and cleanliness in lifestyle. In particular, she praises the 
rustic simplicity of rural Chinese women and criticises urban women as too 
luxuriant and sophisticated.168 Compared with the contents of the programs, 
there are even less differences between these principles of female and male self-
cultivation.      
Fu’s pamphlet did not mention why the new women should make sacrifice 
outside the family. This issue was taken to task by another female writer, Zhao 
Rongxuan. Writing a decade later, Zhao nevertheless provides a vision of 
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society in line with the New Life spirit.169 But the most important element in 
Zhao’s interpretation of the new ethics of women is reciprocity: 
 “Obligation and rights correspond to each other. As long as one enjoys a share 
of rights, one must contribute a share of obligation. Society is only stable when 
obligations and rights are balanced. If you contribute one portion of obligation 
but enjoy ten times the rights, this is exploitation of other’s rights for your 
enjoyment. On the contrary, it is certainly good if you only enjoy one portion of 
rights but contribute ten times the obligation, but this is not sustainable from an 
individual perspective. It can be expected from someone extraordinary but not 
the common man. Thus, from the view of the collective, we certainly should try 
out best to balance our rights and obligations. But from an individual view, we 
would rather contribute more obligations and enjoy fewer rights. If we exhaust 
our energy to make many people enjoy rights and happiness, I fulfil obligations 
for these people and the return I receive would exceed my personal enjoyment. 
Furthermore, if I serve the society, I am indirectly serving myself. Is there any 
reason not to do this service?”170  
Like the Durkheimian view of sacrifice elucidated by Strenski, Zhao regarded 
society as the new sacred. Thus, a morally cultivated housewife should sacrifice 
for society but not ask for return or rights equivalent to their contribution. This 
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argument is like the Confucian reciprocity transposed from lineage to society. 
The application of Confucian ethics helps to justify the new women as 
practitioners of both moral cultivation and sacrifice.  
Confucian ethics and logics also apply for another more strategic group in the 
New Life Movement, the young students in modern government schools. In this 
connection, it is instructive to examine a Bildungsroman, The Model Student 
(Mofan Xuesheng) published in 1934. Written in diary form from the 
perspective of the main protagonist, Chunsheng, a senior primary school student 
in an urban district, the structure and format of the novel is very similar to 
Edmodo d’Amici’s Cuore (Heart). All episodes were similarly about certain 
aspect of moral cultivation when students encountered different moral cases and 
duties.   
In one of the more poignant episodes, the protagonist’s his father used the 
grandmother’s death to teach his sons and daughters a view of life, death and 
sacrifice to the children: 
“Don’t grieve, my child! No one is immortal and grandma is so old! She passed 
life to me and me to you. Grandma toiled for life and now it is our turn. What 
you should do is not to harm your body and strive to be a wholesome person. 
That is your true love for grandma. Your cry offers no good for grandma only 
harms yourself….. Mankind could progress thanks to death! When one is old, 
all functions of life deteriorate, thus he must entrust everything to the thriving 
children, because children are the master of the future. Progress in future world 
depends on your effort…. You know how grandma toiled for life to cultivate us. 
You know how your mum could not sleep and eat and taste all bitterness to 
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cultivate you. Then you should think about the weight of your future 
responsibilities! Don’t grieve, child! From now on, you must put in more effort 
and be more active (in society), and then you would not fail your grandma. She 
will feel happy and grateful to you in another world!”171     
While Confucian filial piety for the elder was not absent in this view, the 
emphasis was no longer ritual obligations but the recognition of this sacrifice 
and the repaying of sacrifice in the form of contribution to the progress of 
society, rather than the family. The same logics of ethical reciprocity can be 
applied to the citizen’s debt to the sacrifice of the martyrs. On the Martyrs’ Day, 
the father again applied his theory of reciprocity to the martyrs:  
“It does not suffice that you shout the slogans and spread the papers. Propaganda 
is certainly important. But more importantly, you should do real works. …You 
must remember to make yourself a wholesome person, with strong will so as 
not to be corrupted by the environment, with healthy body so as to shoulder 
greater responsibility. You also need to study not just general subjects but also 
professional knowledge, so that you will do things with clarity of mind. All in 
all, if you want to commemorate those martyrs who sacrificed for the nation and 
seek happiness for yourself and the society, you must work hard to cultivate 
yourself. Otherwise if you simply take the Day as vacation, you will not only 
miss the meaning of commemoration but also sacrifice your schoolwork. In that 
case, will the Commemorative Day not be harmful for you?”172   
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The paragons for sacrifice and martyrdom in the novel are two charismatic 
teachers, Teacher Zhou and Teacher Gao. Teacher Zhou was a highly dedicated 
teacher who always put the needs of the students before himself. Unlike a 
stereotypical Confucian teacher, Teacher Zhou, who taught the Chinese 
language, always befriended students and enjoyed playing with them. In one of 
the episodes, he insisted on lecturing the students in the classroom, even when 
he was suffering from a severe cough. 173  Teacher Gao was an enthusiastic 
nationalist who volunteered to join guerrilla groups in Manchuria after the 
Mukden Incident of 1931. While in Manchuria, he kept sending back letters to 
encourage his beloved students. Later he was brutally killed by the Japanese. 
The novel devotes a special episode to his memory.174       
While most characters are boys, the author also names an outstanding schoolgirl, 
Shafei, who is admired by the protagonist for her energy and efficiency in school 
activities.175 The girl came from a proletariat background: both her father and 
elder brother were workers and her mother an industrious housewife. Their 
moral teaching was centred on a proletarian view of women as able workers 
with a literal contempt for excess self-cultivation. Although the work was 
completed in the 1930s, it reads like the prescript for girlhood and indeed youth 
cultivation in the Maoist era in the coming decades. For instance, her worker 
father’s instructions for the girl were a clear statement against traditional form 
of cultivation:  
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“You have to use your two hands! Schooling is but a means for you to use your 
hands better! If you only know about books, you will become a bookworm and 
your life will be ruined….You must remember to respect labour. Your father is 
a worker, your elder brother is also a worker and only workers are most valuable 
people….Work as much as possible, be it your schoolwork, help in your mum’s 
housework or some other work, don’t waste your time on speculation! Just keep 
working without any empty thoughts in your mind!”176  
The Model Youth’s ideal of cultivation is a wholesome person ready to take 
hefty responsibilities and make worthy sacrifice for the nation and society. 
Unlike a culturally sophisticated literati gentleman, the wholesome person 
should be cultivated morally, intellectually and physically under rigid self-
discipline, while making sacrifices for the nation and the community. But in the 
book there are still interesting borrowings from Confucian methods of moral 
self-cultivation: the six graders would adopt a rigid table of merits and demerits 
where they note down their daily achievements in self-cultivation in thirty-three 
domains from clean dressing, voluntarism to disciplined sleep.177  
This combination of sacrifice and cultivation was also evident in Republican 
education reform. As mentioned, ethics course in Chinese high schools in the 
1910s still followed Confucian moral cultivation, as evidenced in Cai Yuanpei’s 
textbook. By 1919, the Ministry of Education began to deliberate on a new 
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program of civic education in substitution of the old class in cultivation. In 1923, 
moral cultivation was formally replaced by civic education (gongmin). 
Civic education departed from the Confucian cultivation course in two major 
ways. First, instructions became much broader and more rigid. Whereas the old 
ethics textbook in 1912 essentially consisted of simple Confucian precepts and 
idioms, the new civic textbook in the 1933 amassed well over two hundred “dos 
and do nots”, formulated in prescripts like “I do like humour and I can tell 
jokes”. 178  Second, whereas the old textbooks still upheld the ideal of the 
Confucian gentlemen, it is completely replaced by the rigidly formulated ideal 
of the model citizen. Lastly, the new textbook now contained prescriptions and 
urges for daily sacrifice or preparation for sacrifice, such as timely donations, 
bodily training, and community voluntarism, the courage to sacrifice for the 
nation and the obligation to protect the weak. 179   
Despite vigorous efforts to incorporate Confucian ideals, the New Life project 
and the Nationalist civic education yielded ambiguous fruits for the old 
Confucian ideal. On the one hand, such efforts led to an expansion of the self-
cultivation as understood in Confucian terms. Mostly notably, the state and 
social groups sought forcefully to improve the health and fitness of the body of 
citizens in order for them to make worthy sacrifices for the national cause. We 
have demonstrated how far this is achieved through Confucian moral prescripts 
and reasoning.  
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On the other hand, such efforts caused the entropy of Confucian cultivation per 
se since the old idea could no longer carry such a hefty program as modern self-
cultivation for national sacrifice. In twentieth century China, even shen 
increasingly meant the body instead of the tradition notion of the self, as the 
fledging modern state embarked on the political project of cultivating such 
bodies. The meaning of cultivation is thus transformed along with sacrifice. 
Since the 1930s, the idea of cultivation has been better conveyed by the concept 
of development (發展 fazhan), which means wholesome development of an 
individual person, often with political connotations.  
The New Life Movement marked a departure from the sacrificial ethos of the 
intellectual migrants, as the undisciplined and spontaneous sacrificial ethos of 
students or intellectual vagabonds gave way to new military virtues of soldiers 
or Whampoa cadets. At a political level, this shift reflected marginalization of 
the civilian leaders and literati revolutionaries such as Wang Jingwei and their 
subjugation to modern military leaders like Chiang Kai-shek.180 Under the new 
programs of cultivation as wholesome personal development for the nation, a 
new generation of youth was placed under an essentially military program of 
self-formation centred on rigid self-discipline, subjection to the authority and 
cultivation of the body in preparation for war and sacrifice. 
Unprecedented efforts from the state to cultivate its citizens notwithstanding, 
the New Life experiment eventually failed its mission. It was probably not the 
fault of the program, which was as comprehensive as it could possibly be. The 
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failure was due to another rival program which proved to be much more 
powerful in the long run. In 1942, the Communists also brought forwards their 
own version of self-cultivation for the members of the Party.181This was a much 
more political program designed to subjugate all Party members under the 
central command for a common revolutionary cause. Unlike the Nationalists, 
the Communists were prepared to build a Leninist military organization to see 
their discipline carried to the utmost.182   
 
Conclusion: Combination of Cultivation and Sacrifice in Early 
Twentieth Century China 
 
For almost a millennium, the selfhood of the Chinese elite was tempered in the 
furnace of the neo-Confucian moral order. While sacrifice also played a role in 
the formation of the neo-Confucian self, it was for the most part placed under 
the dominant idea of cultivation and practiced more frequently by literati 
women in everyday life. But from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth 
century, sacrifice overtook cultivation as the prime model of self-formation 
among a large section of Chinese youth, well before it was officially enshrined 
in the curriculum of the Nationalist party-state. This drastic change in the mode 
of self-formation was prompted by a host of historical forces, especially the 
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abolishment of Civil Service Examination and the militarization of Chinese 
society in the early twentieth century.  
The decline of traditional self-cultivation within the modern elite ethos did not 
mean that self-cultivation becomes unimportant for elite and popular self-
formation. As mentioned, the old elite still honoured cultivation as the ideal path 
to sagehood. Also, a large chunk of the popular society in North and Northeast 
China, including urban women, took on cultivation as a new mode of self-
formation. These women often drew from Confucian vocabulary of self-
cultivation to furnish categories of reflection and action and constructed 
narratives of their selfhood to trace the development of an autonomous self 
towards moral and universal goals of the societies.183 Moreover, as discussed in 
this chapter, the program of cultivation had been expanded and broadened to 
incorporate self-discipline and bodily cultivation as it became subordinated to 
nationalistic sacrifice.  
While this transformation is a major break with China’s traditional model for 
personhood, it also marks a fundamental continuation with traditional 
Confucian moral logics. Recall the principle of ritual reciprocity we cited from 
Shiji. As I have discussed in this chapter, this reciprocity also applied to the 
principles of Republican self-formation. Instead of the ancestors and mothers, 
the individual citizens or party members, regardless of their gender and social 
background, must sacrifice to the society, the nation, the Party or the motherland 
in repayment for the alleged sacrifice that the collectives have made for the 
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individual’s cultivation. 184   While the first chapter reveals the impact of 
Christian ideals on modern Chinese political rituals, this chapter is a reminder 
of the enduring importance of Confucian moral for the moral underpinnings of 
these rituals.  
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The Conceptual Transformation of Sacrifice and Its Aftermath 
 
The conceptual transformation of sacrifice in modern China is part and parcel 
of a larger global process which began with the onslaught of linear time in the 
Axial Age. In On Sacrifice, Moshe Halbertal locates the origin of this process 
in the Abrahamic traditions, where we can find the first clear example of the 
concept of sacrifice for in the earliest biblical and exegetical literature.185 In 
particular, it could be traced to the Jewish religious reform after the demise of 
the Temple, which gave priority to an interiorized form of sacrifice rather than 
ritual offering.186  Later, a more general interiorized idea of moral sacrifice 
which essentially involved making individual life a part of divine plan and a 
secular history was rearticulated in the formative years of early Christianity, 
most saliently in Paul’s demand for living sacrifice from the early Christians.187 
As discussed in the work of Strenski and Burckhardt, the Christian notion of 
sacrifice was transposed to sacrifice in modern Western politics during the 
process of secularization and modern state-building.  
This thesis has discussed China’s full encounter with this quintessential 
Christian sacrifice in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the 
European colonial empires made inroads in transforming the Chinese world and 
converting young Chinese elites to modern ideas. The uniqueness of the Chinese 
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case, as discussed extensively in the thesis, lies in the rather abrupt and 
revolutionary break from the past in political rituals, spiritual concepts and 
dominant self-formation in the relatively short period of a few decades.   
This uniqueness of the Chinese case is best understood in comparison with 
Japan. Both China and Japan underwent modern state-building and massive 
mobilization in late nineteenth and twentieth century, but Japan did not share 
the same experience in its transformation of sacrifice. In modern Japanese usage, 
while sacrifice sometimes has a moral connotation, the one who sacrifice, 
Giseisha 犠牲者, means a victim rather than a martyr188; the modern Japanese 
category of spirituality or Seishin 精神 is also more often identified with mental 
activities rather than collective consciousness or character. 189 In ritual terms, 
political and moral sacrifice of the subjects was still cultivated within the 
framework of reinvented imperial ritual system centered on the divine identity 
of the Emperor. 190 In terms of self-formation, there is stronger continuation 
between the Samurai self and the modern Japanese self, and no such major break 
between as between the literati self and the revolutionaries self. But in terms of 
efficacy in mobilizing national sacrifice, the modern Japanese state was 
certainly as able as the modern Chinese state and much more powerful than its 
Tokugawa predecessors.   
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Why was there such a difference? One simple way to explain this is to compare 
two different political traditions and national formations. Japan has an imperial 
lineage that allegedly dates back to mythic times, while China is attuned to 
dynastic cycles of different empires. Faced with the onslaught of linear time, 
early modern Japan would find a convenient way to make their ancient myth of 
the Emperor into a modern political theology, whereas Qing China found it 
much harder to create such a vision.191 Modern China was able to achieve this 
linear ideology only with the invention of modern myth like the myth of Sun 
Yat-sen we have discussed in the first chapter.    
Moreover, Meiji Japan was a relatively homogenous society still with power for 
self-defense, whereas late Qing and Republican China was a weak state 
penetrated by foreign powers and unsettled by internal tensions. This inherent 
weakness of the Chinese state prevented it from carrying out a Japanese style 
ritual reform of the Manchu emperorship. 192 These two factors contributed 
significantly to China’s belated response to the political and cosmological 
challenges from the West and even Japan. In contrast to the national empire 
solution of Meiji Japan, China eventually had to undergo a period of painful 
cosmological revolution to reach its own model of a socialist multinational state.  
As recent works on Chinese religion demonstrate, the period of this 
cosmological revolution of linear time also witnessed the proliferation of 
sectarian movements as well as a rebirth of the old spiritual and divination 
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practices, which had a larger presence than the New Culture Movement.193 Even 
in politics, where changes were most consequential, matters remained far from 
settled until the  1920s. In 1924, the most powerful man in China was Wu Peifu, 
a literati-general who still conscientiously struggled to organize and discipline 
his troops according to Confucian prescripts and positioned himself in Luoyang, 
not only for its strategic value, but also for its cosmological status as an epicenter 
of older empires. 
The events in the 1930s and 1940s were perhaps more decisive in the 
institutionalization of this transformation. Although the New Life Movement 
already kick-started a national attempt to mold citizens along the sacrificial 
model, the real driving force that sped up the process was the successive total 
wars between 1937 and 1953. As Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War 
set the order of the day, all political forces began to demand huge sacrifices from 
the Chinese societies they controlled, not only in terms of the sacrifice of the 
soldiers, and equally significant economic contribution of common people, 
especially in rural Sichuan, which served as the base for the war of national 
survival.194 
The subsequent Maoist revolutionary campaigns from the 1950s through the 
late 1970s would be best understood as the continuation and culmination of the 
transformation of sacrifice. For one thing, the rituals, ethos and spirit of moral 
and political sacrifice would continue their rapid development after 1930 and 
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reached the heights of their dominance in the Cultural Revolution, when the 
principle of self-cultivation was fully subjected to an ethics of sacrifice. 
The revolutionary cosmology entered a period of slow decline since the 1980s 
as the old cosmological practices such as spiritual cultivation revived. Qigong, 
a reinvented cosmological practice, became the most popular means of bodily 
cultivation in the 1980s and 1990s. 195 But even as the old gods and spirit 
returned, the legacy of the cosmological revolution remains alive in the 
teleology of national development. In the domain of contemporary Chinese self-
formation, this official discourse of development finds a paralleled practice of 
self-cultivation based on the concept of human quality (素质, Suzhi) . 196  
The transformation of sacrifice in early twentieth-century China is the product 
of China’s encounter and accommodation with the linear cosmology nurtured 
and informed by the Christian tradition. So far, my study only examines three 
of the more important aspects in its conceptual transformation. Due to limited 
time and resources, I have yet to fully engage with the historical context of the 
transformation. For one thing, I have only examined certain aspects of reactions 
to the global trend among China’s nationalistic intellectual and political elite. 
Also, I have also focused exclusively on top-level institutions and elite practices 
rather than the majority of the society. A more accurate understanding of the 
transformation would certainly need to examine the larger part of the society, 
including their changing ideas and practices of sacrifice.  
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Moreover, I have no room to discuss the chemical transformation of nature and 
life. Following the wide-spread application of chemical technology, traditional 
material life dominated by natural cycles was transformed into a new form of 
life characterized by synthetic materials and mediated nature. Sacrifice in this 
domain is best exemplified by the exploitation of fossil fuels from the nature 
and the destruction of the planet, which translates into the human account as 
economic growth. 197  This chemical transformation is perhaps the most 
important factor in making linear time the dominant mode of cosmology. 
This study is thus only a prelude to a more in-depth and comprehensive research 
program on the transformation of sacrifice in all its depth and richness. Its key 
contribution is to define and delineate the transformation across the domains of 
ritual, spiritual ideas and self-formation. We would still need much wider and 
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Abstract or Spirit 
of a Person or a 
Collective 
 












Spirit or energy  
 




(Old Cultivation) Jing精 
Xian仙 
Shen神** 
The divine or 
non-human spirit 






Shen/Shenxian   
神/神仙 
God 



















*The main corresponding spiritual practices are in brackets.  
**Note that some thinkers such as Wang Fuzhi would use a different meaning 
of shen to denote a concept closer to quintessential spirit and modern jingshen.  
